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ABSTRACT
This work is an attempt at a critical study of 
*an empiricist tradition on the subject of miracles'.
This tradition is the one that began with David Hume's 
argument against miracles and was then carried on by J* S. 
Mill and some contemporary empiricists. The views of these 
thinkers are discussed not with a view to developing any 
explanatory theory of miracles, but with the intention of 
estimating how far the tradition as a whole has succeeded 
in establishing its claim against miracles.
The discussions begin with a very brief repro­
duction of the opinions that had been maintained by some
eminent philosophers prior to the development of this
empiricist tradition. This is done in Chapter I, The
views of Hume, Mill and some present-day empiricists are
then taken up separately in three successive chapters for
somewhat detailed considerations. Finally, it is maintained
in conclusion that these empiricists have not been able
to produce any decisive argument against miracles and that
the tradition has thus failed to establish its case against
miracles.
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INTRODUCTION
Empiricism is perhaps as old as philosophy it­
self , hut it did not come to flourish in philosophy before 
the seventeenth century of the Christian era except only 
for a brief while at the time of the Sophists of the early 
Greek period* At the beginning of the modern age a number 
of eminent philosophers increasingly applied the empiricist 
method in philosophical investigations* Through the works 
of thinkers like Locke, Berkeley and Hume during the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries empiricism came to establish 
itself as a definite and vigorous creed in philosophy*
These classical empiricists emphasized that 
sense-experience is the only guide in our understanding of 
the world; that it is the only method and criterion of 
knowledge and truth* In their opinion any belief or judg­
ment that cannot be established on the evidence of experience, 
is to be treated as uncertain, false or even superstitious; 
no ideas are true that are not tractable in terms of sense- 
experience, According to them all concepts, all knowledge* 
and all scientific generalisations are ultimately reducible 
to sensations and perceptions.
Classical empiricism is thus the philosophy that 
resulted from the application of this method and criterion of 
knowledge in the attempt to explain the facts of life and
the world; it subjected all our beliefs including those 
about matter, mind, God and religion to the test of its 
own criterion and offered its opinions on them. Classical 
empiricism that thus developed has continued through cent­
uries till our time; even to-day many philosophers accept 
this classical method of investigation and develop their 
philosophies in the line of this classical tradition.
Religion as an enterprise is deep-rooted in human 
life. Philosophers of all ages have tried to interpret 
religion with all our beliefs that are connected with it.
It is therefore only natural that the empiricists came to 
take up the subject for consideration from their point of 
view. They have thus subjected to empiricist scrutiny all 
our beliefs in God, revelation, miracles and other things 
related to religion. The early empirical philosophers, 
besides making important contributions in the field of 
epistimology, gave their opinions regarding matters of 
religion including the subject of miracles. But in» this 
respect their views were not very much different from those 
of non-empiricist thinkers. In fact, the early empiricists 
accepted the revealed nature of religion without much criti­
cism. It is David Hume who took up the subject of religion 
including that of miracles for a serious consideration from 
the empiricist point of view. As a result of his attempt at 
a thorough application of the empiricist method to these
subjects he came to develop opinions which widely differed 
from the traditional views.
Hume took up the subject of miracles for a special 
consideration with a view to ascertaining whether the belief 
in miracles is reasonable or not. He concluded that the 
belief in miracles is not a reasonable one* He in fact 
denied that miracles actually happen. He claimed in his 
essay *'0f Miracles'*^ that he had given in it a decisive 
argument against miracles.
Hume's position in respect of the subject of 
miracles has come under criticism in all subsequent times.
But it has also found supporters among the later empiricists 
down to our time. They have tried to defend it against 
criticism and have made modifications to strengthen it.
Among the nineteenth Century empiricists, John Stuart Mill 
strongly supported Hume's opinions on the subject and made 
further developments. In our days also there are philo­
sophers who have followed the same line of thought regarding 
the subject of miracles and have accordingly developed 
their arguments against miracles. Thus it %#ill be seen 
that the views which Hume offered marked the beginning of 
a particular trend of thought on this subject, which passed 
through Mill and has continued till to-day. It may therefore
1. David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 
Section X.
8be said that the views of these empiricists on this subject 
have formed a tradition which I like to call "an empiricist 
tradition on the subject of miracles."
Though there have been much discussions about 
Hume's views on the subject of miracles, I feel that there 
is still scope for further consideration of his views, part­
icularly with reference to the later developments as hinted 
to above. In other words, we may consider what I have 
called "an empiricist tradition on the subject of miracles" 
with a view to estimating not only how far Hume succeeded 
in establishing his position but also how far the later 
developments have accomplished by way of establishing the 
case against miracles. This I propose to do in the 
following pages.
I like to mention that my discussions of the 
subject under consideration will be confined to the views 
of those thinkers only who have followed the classical emp­
iricist method of investigation in formulating their opin­
ions about miracles. I should eilso like to indicate that 
I do not propose to develop here an explanatory theory of 
miracles; my main purpose will be to produce a critical 
account of the views of these philosophers on the subject 
so as to determine how far the tradition under consideration
has succeeded on the whole in establishing its fundamental 
position against miracles.
I feel I should briefly state here the plan I 
shall follow in my treatment of the subject. Though the 
tradition, as I take it, begins with Hume, I think that in 
order to understand Hume's position it will be helpful 
to indicate in short the opinions other philosophers had 
been maintaining upto his time. This I shall do before 
coming to a treatment of the empiricist tradition itself.
So this will be the subject-matter of our chapter I.
The discussion of the empiricist tradition begins 
with Hume; thus. Chapter II will be devoted to a consider­
ation of Hume's views on miracles. I shall then examine 
Mill's views on the subject indicating the developments 
made by him from Hume's position. This will form the 
contents of Chapter III. I shall then pass on to a consid­
eration of the views of some present-day philosophers®
This will make Chapter IV. Finally, we shall try to bring 
together the results of our previous discussions in order 
to arrive at a conclusion about the subject under consider­
ation. Our conclusion will be that the empiricist tradition 
on the subject of miracles, as I take it, has not succeeded 
in establishing its fundamental case against miracles.
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CHAPTER I 
SOME VIEWS ON MIRACLES BEFORE HUME
The concept of miracles is connected with religion* 
Religion places before mankind all-perfect and all-good God 
to Whom we all should, we are told, be obedient* In 
different religions miracles are said to have occurred to 
convince people that there is a God* Miraculous events 
are referred to as coming directly from some divine origin, 
i.e. God.
Dorner defines miracles as "sensuously cognisable 
events not comprehensible on the ground of the causality of 
Nature and the given system of Nature as such, but essentially 
on the ground of God's free action alone. Such facts find 
their possibility in the constitution of nature and God's 
living relation to it, their necessity in the aim of revel­
ation, which they subserve."^ Ramsey accepts that "an 
event is a miracle (a) when it is in some obvious way 'non- 
conforming' - a miraculum and (b) when it is thereby a sign ... 
as well; a sign traditionally of God's power, sometimes, in
1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XV, l4th edition, p. 58?«
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particular, of his kindness and so on*"^
We may recognise two aspects of miracles, negative 
2
and positive. The negative aspect of miracles is that
they are not explicable by the order of nature as we know
it; the positive aspect is that owing to their character
we are led to refer them directly to the divine causality.
We may also recognise a subjective and an objective aspect
of miracles.^ The subjective aspect of a miracle is that
it makes an impression on our mind so as to make us believe
in the revealed nature of religion and in God. Objectively
a miracle is an event in nature; but it does not fit in
with the usual course of events in nature and thus is quite 
different from events having natural explanation. Every
object explainable by natural causation could form a part of 
human cognition. Now, miracles as observable phenomena in 
nature arouse a curiosity in us to look for their place in 
the realm of our knowledge. In the objective character­
isation of miracles we try to trace their place in human 
cognition. It may be noted that the negative aspect of mir­
acles points to the objective side and the positive aspect 
to the subjective side.
1. I.T. Ramsey, Miracles: An Exercise in Logical Mapwork,
p. l8o
2® Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XV, l4th edition, p. $88.
3o F.R. Tennant, Miracle and its Philosophical Presup­
positions, p. 5.
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Theologians and some philosophers emphasised 
the positive side of miracles. They accepted matters of 
religion including miracles as a matter of faith and then 
tried to give some justification for their faith. They 
thus developed their own views on the subject of miracles.
We shall very briefly indicate below some of the repre­
sentative views on the subject given by philosophers before 
Hume.
Saint Augustine (35^ - 430) gave a philosophy of 
the miraculous. He believed that God's will was the ultimate 
source of all things. In his opinion absolute transcendence 
of the First Cause would induce an absolute dualism of 
creator and creature. This belief drove him to the 
conception of a continuous nature extending from the supreme 
being to the lowest grade of existence. We should here 
keep in mind that Augustine was not an immanentist in the 
sense of making the creature constituent of the creator, 
but his whole thought was of God, ordinator as well as 
creator, controlling all things. To him, nothing can be 
'contra naturam* which happens by God's will. He writes,
"How can that be against nature which is effected by the
will of God - the Lord and Maker of all Nature? A Port­
ent, therefore, is not against nature, but against the most
common order of nature."^ Augustine took no account of
1. St. Augustine, City of God (Trans, by J* Healey), Vol. II., 
Book XXI, Chapter VIII, pp. 301-2.
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supernatural causes in order to explain a miraculous event• 
The word 'supernatural* was not yet invented and the idea 
was foreign to his mind*
Thomas Aquinas (1225? — 1274) thought that reason 
and faith were both concerned with the same object, but in 
different ways. The former starts from sense-data and 
attains to a knowledge of the existence, the unity, the 
goodness, the intelligence, and the %fill of God; the latter 
rests on revelation and authority and attains to a knowledge 
of God as a purely Spiritual Being. Moreover, true reason 
and faith can never be contradictory, for they both come 
from the one source of all truth, God, the absolute one.
He also held the opinion that the entire order of secondary 
causes as well as their power comes from God. God can act 
outside the order of secondary causes. In fact, he occasion­
ally does something independently of natural causes for 
man's profit. When effects are thus wrought by divine 
power outside the order of secondary causes, they are called 
miracles. They are properly so-called because they are 
marvels which can be done by something surpassing the order 
of nature. The word 'miracle' stands for what God alone 
can work.
Now, although miracles occur outside the order of 
secondary causes, we should not say that they are against 
nature. "The natural order makes provision for the
14
subjection of the lower to the activity of the higher#
Thus effects brought about in lower bodies in consequence 
of the influence emanating from the heavenly bodies are not 
said to be simply against nature although they may at times 
be against the particular nature of this or that thing, as 
we observe in the movement of water in the ebb and flow of 
the tide which is produced by the action of the moon# In 
the same way effects produced in creatures by the action of 
God may seem to be against some particuleur order of second­
ary causes; yet they are in accord with the universal order 
of nature. Therefore miracles are not contrary to nature*"^ 
Saint Thomas says that since God is the first agent all 
subsequent agents are likened to His instruments# It is 
not contrary but most becoming to the nature of an instrument 
to be moved by the principal agent. "Neither, therefore, 
is it contrary to nature, that creatures be moved by God 
in any way whatsoever: since they were made that they might
serve Him • • • • All nature is the work of the Divine art# 
Now it is not inconsistent with a work of art that the artist 
makes some alteration in his work, even after giving it its 
first form* Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature 
if God does something in natural things, other than that
1# St. Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, Translated by S.J. 
Cyril Voilert, pp. 145-6.
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which occurs in the ordinary course of nature,"^
Bishop Butler (I692 - 1752) considered miracles 
as the proof of revelation* According to him revelation 
is supplementing and not contradicting reason, though he 
admitted that its content can only be obscurely comprehended©
He wanted to prove the truth of miracles by showing the 
falsity of the possible objections against revelation as 
being miraculous. Revelation, and for that matter the 
occurrence of miracles, might be objected to as factual, 
firstly because they are not discoverable by reason or 
experience and secondly because they are unlike the known 
course of nature. But Butler thought that there is no pre­
sumption, from analogy of nature, against revelation or miracles 
simply because they are not discoverable by reason or 
experience. Because both the scheme of nature and the 
dispensation of Providence are so immeasurably vast and 
infinitely extensive that even the most enlarged mind can 
comprehend only a very minute portion thereof and must admit 
that there are innumerable things of which it is wholly 
ignorant and which could not be discovered at all but 
by revelation. The things incomprehensible in nature 
prepare us to admit things incomprehensible in religion.^
1. St. Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, Trans, by Dominican 
Fathers, Vol. Ill, Part II, pp. 58-9*
2. Bishop Butler, The Analogy of Religion, edited by J.H. 
Bernard, pp. 155 ff*
3. Ibid, p. 1560
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That the miraculous is unlike the known course 
of nature is not again a presumption against it* "For 
there is no presumption at all from analogy, that the whole 
course of things, or Divine government, naturally unknown 
to us, and everything in it, is like to anything in that 
which is known; and therefore no peculiar presumption 
against anything in the former, upon account of its being 
unlike to anything in the latter."^ We cannot presume 
that the whole course of nature unknown to us is in every 
particular like that portion which we know; but the con­
trary, for there are in it things exceedingly dissimilar. 
Therefore, the a priori objection against miracles on 
account of their dissimilarity with known course of nature 
is analogous to the a priori objections raised by a person 
against extra-ordinary phenomena of nature of which he is 
totally ignorant but which are nevertheless facts.
Butler, therefore, thought that miracles are not 
incredible. He admitted that a miracle was related to and 
necessarily implied a course of nature from which it differed. 
He pointed out that while nature was carried on by general 
laws, God's miraculous interpositions might have also been 
by general laws of wisdom. He made use of the phrase
1. Bishop Butler, The Analogy of Religion, edited by 
J.H. Bernard, pp. 156-7.
2. Ibid, p. l6l.
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"general laws of wisdom" to indicate the sense in which 
miracles took place in conformity with law. He believed 
"that miracles, though they are brought about by immediate 
Divine causation, are not on that account lawless, but are 
worked according to a wise plan."^
John Locke (1632 - 1704)^ who was the founder of 
modern empirical epistemology supported the view that 
rational and natural theology was beyond question. He 
adhered to the view that miracle was both the object and 
cause of rational belief. A miracle, according to him, is 
"a sensible operation which, being above the comprehension 
of the spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the est­
ablished course of nature, is taken by him to be divine#"^
A miracle is no mere wonder; for Locke, it must be a witness 
to somebody of someone's mission from God# He thought that 
the significance of a miracle was the power of God it ex­
hibited in the totality of a certain situation. Miracles
1. H.S. Box, Miracles and Critics, p. 49#
2o Although chronologically Locke comes before Butler,
I have here deviated from the chronological order, 
because I feel it convenient to place Locke 
immediately before Hume for indicating the beginning 
of the 'empiricist tradition on the subject of 
miracles' in the history of classical empiricism#
3» John Locke, A Discourse on Miracles, incorporated 
in The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. by 
I.T. Ramsey, p# 79#
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were to him credentials given by God to his messenger, 
so that men through testimony were able to know that 
Christ's revelation was God's. It was the basis on which 
Christ's divine mission was always established; and conse­
quently the foundation on which believers in any divine 
revelation must ultimately bottom their faith.
We should note here that Locke's views on the 
subject of miracles are obviously inconsistent with his 
empirical standpoint. As I.T. Ramsey points out, the 
criterion for knowledge, according to Locke is experience, 
and so everything which is called knowledge has to be port­
rayed in terms of ideas of sensations. Now, miracles for 
him concern more than outward and external force. There is 
something inwardly compelling about the subject of miracles.
So no observable criterion will ever be adequate to give an 
account of miracles. Locke's view is that miracles will never 
be tractable in terms of ideas of sensations, but are some­
thing of which in the last resort we are intuitively aware, 
something which in this sense is mysterious. But from the 
empirical standpoint Locke can never acknowledge any knowledge 
to be mysterious.^ Thus his discussion of the significance 
of miracles, however valuable it might otherwise be, is
1. Remarks by I.T. Ramsey, in his edition of The Reasonable­
ness of Christianity, by Locke, p. 90.
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certainly in conflict with his empirical point of view. In 
fact, Locke did not realise this, because, in spite of his 
empiricism, he could not shake off the influence of dogmatic 
theology.
The philosophers, mentioned above, all accepted 
miracles as a matter of faith, and tried to give some 
justification for their faith. But things could not remain 
at such a state. Empiricism, having been accepted as a 
method in Philosophy and criterion for knowledge and truth, 
was sure to be applied at some stage to problems other than 
those to which its application showed considerable success 
at the hands of the early empiricists like Locke and Berkeley# 
Berkeley, of course, took empiricism beyond the stage where 
Locke left it, but it was David Hume who applied the 
empirical method to matters of religion with the serious 
intention of determining the reasonableness of religious 
beliefs. His consideration of the subject of miracles is 
a very special and interesting case of this application, 
which resulted in the development of a particular trend of 
thought on the subject; and this we shall consider in the 
subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER II 
HUME ON MIRACLES
Hume in his book "An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding" deals with the subject of miracles in Section 
X under the caption "Of Miracles". He begins with a refer­
ence to an argument against the doctrine of "Transubstant- 
iation" given by Dr. Tillotson, a famous seventeenth century 
Anglican Divine: "There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings,
an argument against the real presence, which is as concise, 
and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be
supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious
1 2 refutation." Tillotson's argument which Hume refers to
is to be found in the "Discourse against Transubstantiation"
first published in 1684# The point in Hume's referring
to this argument is that the argument he himself develops
is in some respect simileur in structure to that of Tillotson's.
But it should be noted that Tillotson as a theologian did
not develop a philosophical standpoint and had not the
subtlety of reasoning and understanding with which Hume
developed his philosophical argument on the subject of
miracles, from the standpoint of his genersuL empirical
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, Second edition, p.109#
2. This argument can be seen in Tillotson's Works, ed. by 
To Birch, Vol. II, p. 448. Also quoted by À. Flew,
Hume's Philosophy of Belief, p. 172.
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philosophy.
Hume's argument against miracles is developed in 
two parts of the section# In the first part he offers more 
or less an *a priori’^  argument# In it, though he admits
the logical possibility of miracles, he denies their actuality
2
or what Flew calls their physical possibility# He says 
that no evidence is able to establish a miracle as a fact 
and accordingly our belief in miracles is unreasonable#
Hume is of opinion that a priori anything may 
be the cause of anything# His fundamental thesis in both 
the Treatise and the Enquiry is that what is conceivable 
is possible# He says, "there can be no demonstrative 
arguments to prove, that those instances of which we have 
had no experience resemble those of which we have had ex­
perience# We can at least conceive a change in the course
of nature; which sufficiently proves that such a change is 
not absolutely impossible# To form a clear idea of anything 
is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone 
a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it«"^
So according to Hume abstractly miracles are possible#
1# A Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief, p# 173o 
2# Ibid, pp# 186-7#
3# D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, 
Section VI, (Everyman's ed. pp# 91-2)#
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The question before him, is: Taking a miracle purely from
its objective aspect, are we able to pronounce that it 
actually occurs? He designs to prove that miracles which 
have not been the objects of our senses, at least such as are 
said to have been performed in attestation of any religious 
system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believed on 
the testimony of others.
Hume takes experience as the only guide in reason­
ing concerning matters of fact. Experience is in some 
things variable, in some things uniform. A variable ex­
perience gives rise only to probability; a uniform ex­
perience amounts to a proof and thus gives us a law of nature* 
Probability always supposes an opposition of different experi­
ments and observations. One side that is found to over­
balance the other produces a degree of probability proportioned 
to its superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite 
experiments and deduct the lesser number from the greater in 
order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. Our 
belief or assurance of any fact from the report of the eye­
witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience; 
that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony and 
of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. 
Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it
is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, here 
is a contest of two opposite experiences of which the 
one destroys the other as far as its force goes, and the
23
superior can only operate on the mind by the force which 
remains.
In the case of a miraculous event the same prin­
ciple of experience works. Hume defines a miracle as "a 
transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition 
of the Deity, by the interposition of some invisible agent.
A firm and unalterable experience has established Laws of 
Nature. As a miracle goes against a firm and unalterable 
experience, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature 
of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience
can possibly be imagined. If the testimony considered 
apart and in itself amounts to an entire proof, even then
it cannot establish a miraculous event. He says, "There 
must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every 
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that 
appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a 
proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the
p
nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle."
A miracle is of such a nature that no testimony would be 
able to establish it as a fact.
In the second part of his essay on miracles Hume 
tries to strengthen further the position which he holds
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, Second edition, 
p. 115.
2. Ibid, p. 115.
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against the testimony to a miraculous event. He goes on 
to examine whether any such testimony is strong enough to 
prove the alleged abnormalities. In theory we may suppose 
a testimony to be an entire proof, but in actuality it is 
never so. In this connection he offers four arguments 
which may briefly be indicated as follows.
Firstly, history tells us that the witnesses to 
any alleged miracle have never been at once so well-educated 
as to ensure that they are not trying to delude other people© 
And no alleged miracle has been performed "in such public 
manner and in so celebrated a part of the world"^ as to make 
it certain that no fraud has been employed.
In the second place, commonly in our conduct we 
abide by the principle, "that the objects, of which we have
2
no experience, resemble those, of which we have", and "that 
where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give
the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number 
of past observations©"^ But we do not always follow the 
same rule and so believe strongly in miracles. Most people 
have a fondness for what is wonderful and out of the common 
and therefore have a natural tendency to believe in mirac­
ulous events on very slight evidence. "What judgments
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed. Selby-Bigge, Second edition, p. Il6©
2. Ibid, p. 117.
3o Ibid, p. 117©
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they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and 
mysterious subjects; or if they were ever so willing to 
employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the 
regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases 
his impudence: and his impudence overpowers their credulity."^
Thirdly, it is a fact that miracles are very fre­
quent among barbarous and backward peoples. But in the 
enlightened ages when a nation becomes more educated miracles 
become fewer and fewer. Now this strongly suggests that 
miraculous events are believed mainly by the ignorant and 
barbaric people who due to their lack of knowledge of natural.
laws think of many perfectly natural events as miracles.
Fourthly, any two religious systems are incom­
patible with each other and "in matters of religion, whatever
is different is contrary"^. It is therefore impossible that 
different religions "should all of them, be established on 
any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended 
to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of 
them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish 
the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it 
the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every 
other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise 
destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, Second edition,
p. 118.
2. Ibid, p. 121,
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was established; so that all the prodigies of different 
religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and evidence 
of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite 
to each other."^ Thus miracles that are said to have 
occurred in a number of incompatible religions destroy each 
other just as equal number of witnesses for and against a 
crime destroy each other.
Hume then proceeds to consider some particular 
examples of miracles. The first is recorded by Tacitus, 
the historian; Vespasian cured a blind man in Alexandria 
by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch 
of his foot# The second is related by Cardinal de Retz: 
at the cathedral of Saragossa, he was shown a man who had 
been seen for seven years with only one leg but who came 
to possess the second leg within a short time by only rubbing
the holy oil upon the stump. The third example refers to 
the numerous miracles which are said to have been "wrought
in France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris • • • • The curing
of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf and sight to the
blind . . , . " Hume considers the witnesses in favour of
these miracles and concludes, "And what have we to oppose to
such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, second edition, 
p. 121#
2. Ibid, p. 124#
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or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And 
this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone 
be regarded as a sufficient refutation,"^
In the second part Hume once more refers to the 
incompatibility of miracles with 'the most established 
laws of nature' and remarks . that no testimony for
any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much 
less to a proof; and that even supposing it amounted to a 
proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from 
the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to 
establish. It is experience only, which gives authority
to human testimony* and it is the same experience, which 
assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these 
two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do 
but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, 
either on one side or the other, with that assurance which 
arises from the remainder. But according to the principle 
here explained, this substraction, with regard to all popular 
religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore 
we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can 
have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just 
foundation for any such system of religion*"
1* Hume's Enquiries, ed* by Selby-Bigge, Second edition,
p. 125.
2, Ibid, p. 127*
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The argument against miracles as put forward by Hume 
may be summed up as follows. Probability is a matter of 
rational belief based on experience. Taking an event E, 
for example, the probability of its happening again in certain 
circumstances is proportionate to the number of times it has 
happened in the past in such circumstances against the 
number of times it has not happened. If out of 100 cases 
of the particular circumstance B is found to have happened 
in, say, 75 of them, the rational belief in a new E in the 
same circumstance would then be *75 of certainty* Now we 
come to the rational belief in testimony* If testimony 
is right 75 times out of 100, the rational belief in 
testimony is, then, *75 of certainty#
A miracle by definition is contradictory to laws 
of nature. A law of nature is a matter of infallible 
universal uniformity. So the basic probability of a miracle
is one over infinity. As our belief in a miracle is based
only on testimony, the actual probability of such a belief 
can be determined by multiplying the basic probability of 
a miracle by the probability value of the testimony. But we 
have seen that according to Hume, the testimony for miracles 
is less trustworthy than usual for various reasons; therefore 
it will have a very smeCLl value, say .01. So the ultimate 
probability of the belief in a miracle, as reported by such 
testimony will be infinitesimal in contrast with the belief 
in law of nature which does not depend on testimony*
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Now, in respect of his argument against miracles 
as outlined above Hume makes very lofty (extravagant) claims# 
Thus he says, "I flatter myself, that I have discovered 
an argument, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, 
be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious 
delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the 
world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts 
of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred 
and profane#”^ In what follows we shall try to consider 
how far Hume is right in his argument and consequently 
how far his claims are justifiable#
The first thing we should mention is an apparent 
inconsistency in Hume's argument# In view of his funda­
mental position, as indicated above, that what is conceivable 
can never be demonstratively disproved, it is surprising 
that he should speak of absolute impossibility of miraculous 
events. A miracle is perfectly conceivable and is therefore 
logically possible# It would be perhaps improper to think 
in this connection that Hume has here abandoned his funda­
mental standpoint and that he is opposing the theoretical 
possibility of miracles which he allows in the first part of
1# Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, Second edition, 
p. 110.
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the argument. Assuming, therefore, as we must, that Hume 
accepts the logical possibility of miracles we cannot take 
this apparent inconsistency seriously* We have, therefore, 
to accept some such interpretation as suggested by Cameron, 
who says "that we are bound to interpret the expression 
'the absolute impossibility or the miraculous nature of 
the events' in some weaker sense than that of logical im­
possibility* It is, I take it, a rhetorical expression 
designed to express in the strongest possible way Hume's 
conviction as a historian that those who bear testimony to 
miracles are always lying or mistaken*"^ We may, however, 
add that it is a bad rhetoric and certainly a confusing one.
Flew in his treatment of Hume's argument refers
2
to this appeurent inconsistency. While he emphasizes that 
Hume never denies the logical possibility of miracles, he also 
suggests "that the argument of this whole section is officially 
defensive. In such an argument it is to be expected that 
Hume will sometimes be drawing out the consequences of 
assumptions which he does not share, or operating with con­
cepts the legitimacy of which he himself might not in the 
last resort be prepared to accept. It will for this reason
1. J.M. Cauneron, 'Miracles', The Month, Vol. 22, 1959» p. 289*
2. A. Flew, op. cit., pp. I85 ff.
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be wise to be a little slow in raising questions about the 
consistency with Humean principles of certain notions and 
distinctions, which he may seem to be employing, but to which 
perhaps he does not wish unequivocally to commit himself©"^
Now it is difficult to accept Flew's suggestion*
In the first place, Hume himself does not indicate in any­
way what notions, distinctions or assumptions he uses in his 
exposition without committing himself to them. In the 
second place, and this is more important, the contention that 
Hume's argument is officially defensive is hardly tenable.
One of Flaw's theses is that "Hume's argument is
2
essentially defensive." According to Flew "Hume is offering 
a defence against the impertinent solicitations of 'bigotry 
and superstition*, and not an offensive weapon capable of 
positively disproving any claims made,"^ But if we consider 
Hume's argument as a whole, it will be seen that Hume's 
position is not only defensive but also a positively offen­
sive attack upon miracles and that in fact he denies not 
only the reasonableness of our belief in them but also their 
physical possibility, or their actual happening. That Hume 
takes a much stronger position than a defensive one is 
evident from his self-flattering claim as already mentioned
1. A.Flew, op. cit., p, l86.
2. Ibid, p, 176,
3. Ibid, p. 174,
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and from many other expressions and statements some of 
which are noted below.
(a) Hume thinks that he has given a 'decisive 
argument' against miracles which must 'silence the most 
arrogant bigotry and superstition.'^
(b) "A miracle", says Hume, "is a violation of
the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience
has established these laws, the proof against a miracle
from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argu-
2
ment from experience can possibly be imagined,"
(c) "There must . . . .  be a uniform experience 
against every miraculous event . . . .  And as a uniform 
experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and 
full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence 
of any miracle • • •
(d) In his final conclusion Hume says that the 
testimony for any miracle is opposed by another proof which 
results in 'entire annihilation' of the former,
(e) In the very place where he mentions 'absolute
impossibility' of miraculous events, he also speaks of their
L.
'sufficient refutation,'
1, Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, second edition, p, 110,
2, Ibid, p, 114,
3, Ibid, p, 115.
4, Ibid, p, 125,
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All these statements are parts of Hume's conclusions 
or main contentions in the argument# They all very strongly 
suggest and at least one of them namely (c) clearly states 
that Hume denies the existence of miracle as a fact# In 
view of this it is difficult to accept Flew's contention 
that Hume's position is entirely defensive and "not an offen­
sive weapon capable of positively disproving any claims made." 
This also contradicts or refutes Flew's further statement 
made in connection with this thesis that Hume is trying to 
demonstrate "not that as a matter of fact miracles do not 
happen • . • •
This can be seen if we consider another point.
It must be accepted that, according to Hume, we have no right
to believe in any miracle however strong the testimony for
2
it may be# This is how C.D. Broad understands Hume and
3
Flew agrees that Broad is fundamentally right. Flew also 
admits, whereas Broad does not, that Hume is right in his 
disbelief in miracles. Now it should be noted that in 
asserting that our belief in miracles must be wrong, Hume 
in effect denies the existence of miracles. For, when is a 
belief wrong or false? Certainly when it is a belief in
1. A.Flew, op. cit., p. 1?6.
2* C.D. Broad, 'Hume's theory of the credibility of miracles',
P.A.S., 1916-17, p. 80,
3* A. Flew, op. cit., p. 177#
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something which is unreal or does not exist. Thus, if I 
believe in X and if I am told that my belief is false, it 
can only mean that my belief is false because there is no 
X, or X does not exist. Thus, when Hume says that our belief 
in miracles is wrong, he must thereby imply that miracles 
do not happen. When this is realised and the statements we 
have mentioned above are taken notice of, it is no more 
possible to suppose with Flew that Hume does not try to 
demonstrate that miracles do not, in fact, happen.
In a case like that of a miracle where there is, 
as Hume thinks, a conflict of proofs or evidences, there is 
a third alternative to forming an opinion in favour of 
either side; and Hume's 'substraction', if at all possible, 
may not always leave a remainder; for there may be cases of 
complete balance of evidences. Hume does not even mention 
this possibility of a perfect case of scepticism in which 
one should abstain from forming an opinion. And this is 
no small omission. It shows how the author's mind has been 
up against miracles. Clearly, Hume's 'silencer' of "the 
most arrogant bigotry and superstition" is not the suspension 
of judgment, but "a direct and full proof against the exist­
ence of a miracle."
Even Flew, ultimately comes to take Hume as denying
the physical possibility of miracles, though thereby he 
involves himself in an inconsistency with his thesis as
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indicated above. This he does by way of offering a solution 
of the difficulty that arises out of Hume's use of the expres­
sion "absolute impossibility" on which A.E. Taylor has put 
much emphasis. Thus Hew says, "The solution of the dif­
ficulty is simple, but important. The impossibility involved 
is not logical but physical. This physical impossibility 
of miraculous events is a consequence of the definition of 
the word miracle."^ He quotes the definition and then says, 
"the criterion of physical as opposed to logical impossibility
simply is logical incompatibility with a law of nature, in
2
the broadest sense#"
Flew then proceeds to explain this broadest sense 
of laws of nature. In order to do this he brings in a 
very recent concept, viz, that of nomological propositions#
He asserts that "it is an essential characteristic of all 
contingent nomological propositions . . . .  that they imply 
the physical impossibility of any events with the occurrence 
of which they are inconsistent."^ It is to such nomological 
propositions that Hume appeals in opposing the credibility 
of testimony for alleged miracles. Thus, according to Flew, 
Hume is quite rational "when he dismissed on principle stories
1# A. Flew, op. cit., p. l86.
2. Ibid, p. 187.
3. Ibid, p. 187.
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of what he believed to be the impossible: of events, that
is, the occurrence of which would be incompatible with what
he took to be true nomological propositions# If we are to 
have any evidential canons at all we have got to be prepared 
to dismiss a vast range of logical possibilities as being 
impossible in fact."
Now without questioning the legitimacy of imputing 
the most modern concept of nomological propositions to Hume, 
it needs only be said that even on Flew's showing Hume 
asserts the physical impossibility of miraculous events, 
that they are 'impossible in fact'; or in other words, they 
cannot in fact happen. Flew is, certainly, right in this, 
but this definitely destroys his earlier thesis that Hume's 
position is officially defensive because he does not try to 
show that as a matter of fact miracles do not happen.
Now, our next task will be to examine the argument 
which Hume puts forward to deny the actuality of miracles.
The argument is this. Even supposing that the testimony for 
a miracle is a proof, it is directly opposed by another proof, 
"derived from the very nature of the fact", that it is miraculous. 
The second proof, that is, the proof of a law of nature, thereby 
annihilates the first one, and thus the physical impossibility 
of miracles follows as a consequence of the very definition 
of miracles. Miracle, as Hume defines it, is a transgression
1. A. Flew, op. cit., p. 197*
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of a law of nature. So the physical impossibility of a 
miracle consists in its logical incompatibility with a law 
of nature.
What should we mean by this transgression or 
violation of laws of nature? Must nature necessarily be 
uniform forbidding any alteration of her order? To this 
second question we cannot reply either yes or not, for to do 
that it would require us to know the whole course of nature 
which is mortally impossible. So, when Hume speaks of 
violation of laws of nature, he can, and in fact he does, 
refer only to the empirical and not to the absolute sense 
of laws of nature. A law of nature in the sense in which 
the term is used in the empirical sciences is a contingent 
rule or formula established on the basis of experientially 
acquired knowledge. But experience by which we learn that 
things happen and how they happen cannot tell us that they 
must happen. So what Hume calls "a uniform experience", no 
matter how extended or accurate, cannot justify the assertion 
that what we accept as laws in nature offer a direct and full 
proof against any event that is a transgression of a law of Nature.
This brings us to Hume's contention which runs as 
follows; "In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible 
experience, he £a wise magT expects the events with the last 
degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full
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proof of the future existence of that e v e n t B y  infallible
experience he means the experience of events that "are found
in all countries and all ages to have been constantly con-
2
joined together," This is what he calls uniform experience 
amounting to a full proof. Now this full proof is an im­
possibility as a demonstrable proof on Humean point of view.
For the past can be a proof of the future only if it could be 
shown that there is a necessary connection between the past and 
the future. But according to Hume there is no logical relation 
between events or experiences and we cannot therefore speak of 
any necessary connection between the past and the future. So 
Hume cannot give a rationale of his axiom that the course of 
nature will be the same to-morrow that it was yesterday and 
is to-day,
Hume speaks of a rule which would oblige every-body 
to disbelieve fresh intelligence whenever the facts were 
unprecedented. But from his standpoint the establishment 
of such a rule is impossible. For, his conception of 
laws of nature and his analysis of the principle of causality, 
from which such a rule is to be derived, cannot really lend 
any support to it. He accepts as a maxim that no objects 
have necessary connection between them and that all reasoning 
is based on our experience of their constant and regular
1, Hume's Enquiries, ed, by Selby-Bigge, Second edition,
p, 110.
2. Ibid, p. 110.
conjunction*^ He offers an analysis of the principle of 
causality in terms of this conjunction, the utter Inadequacy 
of which seriously Infects his conception of laws of nature 
and thus damages his idiole position*
The principle of causality, according to Hume, Is 
neither intuitively evident, nor deduced from premises*
He argues that reason cannot form the basis of causal 
inferences* He says, "From the first appearance of an ob­
ject, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it* 
But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the
mind, we could forsee the effect, even without experience and 
might at first pronounce with certainty concerning it, by 
mere dint of thought and reasoning*"^
The appeal to the possibility of conceiving the den­
ial of the causality principle is used by Hume as one of the
ways of showing the lack of demonstrative proof for that 
principle* It is not necessary that everything whose exist­
ence has a beginning should also have a cause, because we 
can conceive without contradiction the beginning of some 
event without conceiving its c a u s e S i n c e  we can find no 
reason why this particular event must be the cause of that 
particular event, we cannot say that such particular causes
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed* by Selby-Bigge, Second edition,
p. 111.
2. Ibid, p. 63$
3# A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section 
III, Everyman's ed* p* 82*
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must necessarily have such particular effects, Hume also 
thinks that reason can never make us conclude that a cause 
or productive quality is absolutely requisite to every begin­
ning of existence. He thus denies both necessity and pro- 
ducitivity of causation*^
Now, Hume holds the opinion that we cannot perceive 
anything between a particular cause and its particular effect; 
because he has not much to say about the object-side of cause*
He defines a cause as "An object precedent and contiguous to 
another, and where all the objects resembling the former are
placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those
2
objects that resemble the latter," So Hume's philosophical 
account of causation leads to the position that from the ob­
jective side what we mean by causal connexion is nothing more 
than and different from a mere uniformity of sequence. But 
our causal inferences cannot be justified merely by reference 
to the uniformity*
Hume offers a second definition of a cause. He 
says, "A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to 
another, and so united with it that the idea of the one deter­
mines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impres­
sion of the one to form a more lively idea of the other*"^
1. D, Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, 
Section XIV, Everyman's ed,, pp, 153 ff#
2. Ibid, p. 167o
3. Ibid, p, 167.
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Hume is here concerned with his psychological account of our 
idea of causation# According to his view, we say that A is 
the cause of B when A is followed by B and that from our 
repeated experience of A*s being followed by B's we come to 
associate A and B such that whenever A occurs we expect B«
It is of course possible to raise questions as to 
whether Hume subscribes to both the definitions of cause or 
to either of them*^ But we need not go into that. We need 
only to point out that such psychological explanation of 
causation in terms of habitual psychological associations or 
habits of expectation is quite irrelevant to the logical 
analysis of the conception of either cause or law and cannot 
therefore be a proof against the credibility of miracles*
This being so, we are left with only the philosophical account 
of causation as indicated above, according to which the 
statements of lawful connection are reduced to statements of 
merely numerical conjunction. Such a conception of law 
can "give no ground at all for saying that the occurrence of 
an exception to such a law is physically impossible. Any 
attempt to use our knowledge, or presumed knowledge, of such 
a merely numerical universal proposition, as an evidential 
canon by which to justify the outright rejection of any 
testimony to the occurrence of a falsifying exception would
1. Compare, for example, N.K. Smith, The Philosophy of David 
Hume, p. 391 ff, and J.A. Robinson, 'Hume's Two Definit­
ions of Cause', The Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1962*
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be a preposterous piece of question begging."^
Thus we find that Hume's conception of laws of
nature cannot offer a proof against miracles# Flew makes a
suggestion in this connection and thereby tries to strengthen
the conception of a law of nature so as to make it a ground for
justifying the physical impossibility of any event that is
inconsistent with that law and for opposing testimonial evidences
for such an event# He does this by bringing in the conception
of nomological universal propositions. He makes a distinction
between nomological and extensional universal propositions
and declares that statements of laws of nature are always the
2
propositions of the former sort* In a passage already quoted 
above Flew asserts that nomological propositions essentially 
imply the physical impossibility of events with the occurrence 
of which they are inconsistent* He says elsewhere, "once the 
essential nomological element in the meaning of statements of 
laws of nature is recognised, then it becomes clear that 
knowledge or presumed knowledge of a law of nature could be a 
ground for dismissing as in fact impossible the occurrence of 
anything inconsistent with that law*"'^
The criterion of nomological proposition according to 
Flew is at the same time the criterion of reliability, and "the 
appropriate way to test for reliability is to subject to strains."
1* A. Flew, op. cit., p. 204.
2* Ibid, p. 206*
3# Ibid, p. 205.
4* Ibid, p. 206.
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A nomological proposition is therefore 'thoroughly tested for 
reliability.'
Now we should point out that the distinction of 
extensional and nomological propositions is nowhere to be 
found in Hume's philosophy and the criterion of the nomol­
ogical is not also given by Hume. Flew admits it*^ The 
Humean conception of the laws of nature has, therefore, 
nothing to do with the conception of the nomological. So, 
Flew is wrong in supposing that in his argument against 
miracles Hume is appealing to "what he took to be the nomo- 
logical propositions*" Hume's statement of laws of 
nature considered in the light of this distinction can only 
amount to extensional universal propositions or numerical
propositions which, as we have argued, have no demonstrable 
proof-value at all# Even the nomological propositions, which
of course have a stronger sense than the Humean conception of 
laws of nature, are not so strong as to offer the ground for 
outright rejection of any incompatible event# Flew realises 
this and thus says, "It would be as irrational to deny the 
occurrence of an event simply on the ground that this would 
show some nomological proposition to be false as it would be 
to deny it just on the ground that it would falsify a merely 
extensional universal proposition."^
1. A. Flew, op. cit., pp. 205 - 6.
2. Ibid, p. 187, also p. 197.
3. Ibid, p. 205.
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The significance of Flew's employment of the 
nomological in his conception of laws of nature consists 
not in that he finds here a 'direct and full proof' against 
miracles but in that he utilises it as a principle or canon 
for the assessment of testimony and, for that matter, for 
opposing the testimony for miracles. He does this keeping 
always in mind that Hume's position is officially defensive; 
and we have already argued against the silleged defensive 
character of Hume's argument* As a canon for the assess­
ment of historical testimony, a nomological proposition 
may be a useful guide, but it should be clear from the 
above that it can never have that force which would make 
it a direct and full proof against the testimony for miracles 
(supposed to be a proof) so as to annihilate the latter,
Hume's conception of annihilation of one proof 
by another proof is puzzling. He introduces this idea in 
connection with the opposition of the testimony for miracles 
and laws of nature. He says that here there is an opposition 
of "two kinds of experience", for it is experience only which 
gives authority to human testimony and it is experience 
again which assures us of laws of nature. In such a case 
of opposition of experiences "we have nothing to do but 
substract the one from the other, . . . .  this substraction, 
with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire
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annihilation."^ But is this 'substraction' possible?
'Substraction* is a numerical concept. Abstractly, 
we can subtract one number from another number. As applied 
to matters of fact and experience, subtraction is possible 
when we have numbers of things of the same qualitative type. 
Thus, for example, we can deduct from a group of ten horses 
five of them, leaving a remainder of five horses. But we 
cannot even significantly talk about deducting five cows 
from ten horses, because horses and cows are of different 
qualitative types. Hume speaks of 'substraction* of 
experiences from experiences (when there is an opposition
between them). It is, however, doubtful if such subtraction 
leading to annihilation is at all possible even when the
experiences are all of the same type, for example, when they
2
are all observations. But in the present case, the 
subtraction as suggested by Hume is not between the same kind 
of experiences but between "two kinds of experiences". Hume 
is right in supposing that testimony and direct experience 
are different kinds of experiences and are of different values 
in giving probability of our beliefs. He even recognises, 
and perhaps truly, that all testimonies are not equally 
valuable in matters of rational belief. This being the case
1. Hume's Enquiries, ed. by Selby-Bigge, Second edition, p. 12?
2. Had this been a reasonable procedure, progress in science 
would be an impossibility. Advancement in science is made, 
not by making subtraction of observations from observations, 
but by modifying old explanations (based on a vast number of 
observations) in favour of new ones in order to accommodate 
new facts discovered by a lesser number of observations*
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or, in other words, testimony and direct experience being
two different kinds of experience, they are of different
qualitative types, and accordingly we cannot subtract the
one from the other.
The impossibility of Hume's 'substraction' in the
present case may also be indicated in another way. It may
be said that the evidence from direct experience and the
evidence from testimony are of different orders. The
evidence for my belief in E, when I have direct experience
of E, is what we may call first-hand evidence or first-order
evidence. But the evidence for my belief in E, when I have
no direct experience of E, but only the experience of reports
about E, is only indirect. In contrast with the first-order
evidence, evidence from testimony may be called the second-
order evidence#^ Thus the evidences from testimony and
from direct experience being of different orders, it is
difficult to see how one can be deducted from the other.
As Campbell points out, there is in arithmetic a 'rule' called
reduction, by which numbers of different denominations are
brought to the same denomination; but in metaphysics we have
2
not yet heard of any discovery of a corresponding 'rule'.
1. Though in most cases the first-order evidence is more 
reliable than the second-order evidence, we cannot, 
however, generalise that this is always the case.
2o G. Campbell, A Dissertation on Miracles, p. 29.
47
Certainly, Hume has not discovered such a 'rule*, and in 
the absence of this, it will be impossible, where the evidences 
are of different orders, to ascertain by subtraction if there 
is an annihilation of any proof at all*
Hume rejects the testimony in support of a miracle 
by contrasting it with the observed regularities in which 
according to him laws of nature consist* His conception 
of laws of nature, we have already seen, cannot form a 
basis for such rejection* There is a further difficulty 
in his denial of the credibility of the testimony for 
miracles. This may be explained with the help of an 
illustration* Let us take two past events namely A and B*
Now as we have no direct experience of them, in order to 
determine the plausibility of their occurrence we depend 
on the testimonies which are available* If the testimonies 
in both the cases are reliable and honest, then both of them 
are on the same footing because testimonies, the only yard­
stick by which we are to determine their truth or falsity, 
are of a similar nature. Now if one of the events, say B, 
is miraculous, Hume would reject it instantaneously because 
he thinks it renders the testimony incredible* So instead 
of applying the testimony to determine the nature of the 
event he reverses the order and applies the event of which 
he has no direct experience to judge the testimony that is 
adduced to support the event*
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The difficulty involved here is this. Miracles 
being accepted as logically possible preclude the possibility 
of their being dismissed on the basis of any a priori argument, 
and Hume's laws of nature do not form such a basis. Accord­
ingly, the testimony for a miracle cannot be rejected a priori 
without examination. Thus in the above illustration when 
the event B is said to be a miracle, Hume has no right to 
reject its testimony by referring it to "the very nature 
of the fact"; there is nothing in the fact itself that 
justifies such an outright dismissal of the testimony.
That it is wrong to reject the testimony for an 
event simply on the ground that it is a miracle is clear 
from the following fact. Some of the miraculous events 
the testimony of which was rejected by Hume because he took 
them to be absurd and impossible have now been justified 
as scientifically possible historical events.^ Hume would 
perhaps say, and Flew in fact says, that this by itself does 
not show that Hume was wrong in his disbelief in miracles, that 
the historical justification or the "very reason for accepting 
the evidence for the occurrences is at the same time a decisive 
reason for denying their miraculous character." But this would 
not in the least minimise the mistake committed in the very 
act of rejecting these events as absurd and impossible.
lo A. Flew, op. cit., p. 197»
2. Ibid, p. 197»
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There are two things to be noted in this connection* First, 
this mistsdce definitely proves the defect in Hume's treatment 
of the testimony for miracles in the manner indicated in the 
preceding paragraphs. The second point to be mentioned is 
that if we correct Hume's assumption that we know what the laws 
of nature imply by recognising that our knowledge of them is 
in principle incomplete, we have, then, no application for the 
concept of a violation of laws of nature. This means that 
Hume's concept of a miracle in these terms is confused.
Hume's argument about miracles of different relig­
ions destroying each other is entirely baseless and betrays 
his ignorance of the claims of different religions. We 
know that Christianity does not deny the credibility of the 
miracles of the religions of Moses, Abraham and other predeces­
sors of Jesus Christ. In fact, the Bible is full of 
descriptions and narrations of miraculous events connected 
with the lives of earlier prophets. Islam acknowledges the 
revealed nature of Christianity and the religions of Moses, 
David, Abraham and other earlier prophets mentioned in the 
Quran and accepts the credibility of the miracles of 
Christianity and other earlier revealed religions.
Hume defines a miracle as a violation of laws 
of nature. It is an event that stands against the whole 
of nature. It is something unique. The whole of Hume's
50
discussion seems to be based on this conception of a miracle 
as a unique event which is contrary to all experience.
But in fact some miracles are reported to have occurred 
repeatedly» Now a repeated miracle has been an object 
of a number of experiences. Here we have a case of 
experiences that have been always the same, in other words, 
a case of what Hume would call invariable or uniform exper­
ience. And uniform experience is what he calls a proof 
or a law of nature. This, of course, is a very precarious 
conception of a law of nature, but this is what Hume 
takes a law of nature to be» Now, a miracle by definition 
is a violation of laws of nature, and therefore the law of 
a miracle would be violation of these laws. Thus in the 
case of a repeated miracle there would be an opposition of 
laws of nature. This seems to mean that Hume's definition 
of miracle as a violation of laws of nature should go; and 
indeed, if the 'law* of the repeated miracle is recognised 
(as on Humean principles it should be), there seems to 
remain no possibility of retaining this definition.
Thus the fact of repeated miracles offers a
difficulty which Hume has not considered in his arguments
against miracles. In fact, he has left repeated miracles
completely out of account. But the subject needs a
consideration; and had Hume noticed this, he might have 
given a different account of the subject of miracles as
a whole.
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From the above considerations it is now clear 
that Hume has not succeeded in offering a proof against 
the credibility of miracles and in establishing the unreas­
onableness of the belief in miracles. But in spite of his 
failure Hume has had his followers in respect of his views 
on the subject of miracles. Later empiricist thinkers 
have followed the trend of his thought and have made 
modifications and improvements on his position. His 
treatment of the subject thus marked the beginning of a 
tradition which I have called *an empiricist tradition 
on the subject of miracles.*
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CHAPTER III 
MILL ON MIRACLES.
John Stuart Mill, a disciple of David Hume, was 
very much impressed by his master's argument against miracles. 
He took up the subject with a view to defending Hume's 
position against criticism and strengthening it by effecting 
some modifications and improvements. In his "System of 
Logic"^ he introduces the subject of miracles as an 
illustration of the case of disbelief; and in his "Three
p
essays on Religion" he discusses the subject in connection 
with the question of evidences for revelation.
As an empiricist. Mill like Hume sticks to the 
position that our senses are all that we have to trust to.
In all our reasonings when we have to make some decisions 
we are to depend only on the senses for the truth of the
ultimate premises of the reasonings. Now the evidence for 
miracles is not the evidence of our senses. The witnesses 
to miracles are not even first hand, but resting on the 
attestation of books and traditions. Moreover, the recorded 
miracles. Mill thinks, are such that it would have been very 
difficult to verify them as matters of fact and are hardly
1. J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II,
Book III, Ch. XXV, pp. 164 ff.
2. J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition,
pp. 217 ff*
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ever beyond the possibility of having been due to natural 
causes*^ Mill thus agrees with Hume that experience being 
the only guide in our reasoning concerning matters of fact, 
we can never believe in miracles. The argument proceeds 
on the question of the credibility of miracles. Both Mill 
and Hume think the evidence for miracles as incredible and 
therefore try to disprove the occurrence of miracles.
In his "System of Logic", Book III, Chapter XXV, Mill 
formulates the grounds of disbelief. He holds that there 
are cases where there is not only a matter of not believing 
but the need for actual disbelief. By disbelief, he means 
not merely the absence of belief, "not the state of mind 
in which we form no opinion concerning the subject, but 
that in which we are fully persuaded that some opinion is 
not true; insomuch that if evidence even of great apparent 
strength . . . .  were produced in favour of the opinion we 
should believe that the witnesses spoke falsely, or that
they, or we ourselves, if we were the direct percipients,
2
were mistaken." The positive evidence produced in support 
of an assertion which is nevertheless rejected as improbable 
is never a full proof, but only an approximate generalisation. 
If the negative evidence against such an assertion is also
1. J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, p. 219.
2. J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II,
Book III, Ch. XXV, p. 164.
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an approximate generalisation, it is a case for comparison of 
probabilities* "If however an alleged fact be in contra­
diction, not to any number of approximate generalisations, 
but to a completed generalisation grounded on a rigorous 
induction, it is said to be impossible, and is to be dis­
believed totally*"^
Mill thinks that it is this last principle to 
which Hume appealed in his arguments against miracles.
Thus he says, "Hume's celebrated doctrine, that nothing is 
credible which is contradictory to experience, or at 
variance with laws of nature, is merely this very plain 
and harmless proposition, that whatever is contradictory
p
to a complete induction is incredible*"
Those who may object that Hume's argument against 
miracles is a petitio principii, that we have no right 
to declare the induction complete while facts, supported 
by evidence, present themselves in opposition to it. Mill 
replies that we have the right to declare such a proof, 
without complete enumeration, "whenever the scientific 
canons of induction give it to us; that is, whenever the 
induction can be complete* We have it, for example, in a 
case of causation in which there has been an experimenturn 
Crucis*"^ No quantity of evidence ought to persuade us
lo J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II, 
Book III, Cho XXV, p. 165.
2. Ibid, p. 165.
3o Ibid, p* 166*
55
that there has occurred anything in contradiction to an 
established law which is the result of a completed induction.^ 
If, however, the evidence in favour of a contrary fact is 
such that it is more likely that the set of observations 
and experiments on which the law rests should have been 
inaccurately performed than that the evidence in question 
should be false, we may believe the evidence; but in that 
case the supposed law must be abandoned for a better estab­
lished law. Mill thus holds that we cannot admit a
proposition as a law of nature and yet believe a fact in
2
real contradiction to it*
In order that any alleged fact should be contra­
dictory to a law of causation, the allegation. Mill points 
out, must be not simply that the cause existed without being 
followed by the effect but that this happened in the absence
3
of any adequate counteracting cause.^ But in the case of 
an alleged miracle the assertion is the exact opposite of 
this. In this case the effect is said to have been defeated
lo Mill has now an account of completed induction based on
*experimentum crusis* and the principle of uniformity of 
nature, which gives him a sharper notion of a law of 
nature than that of Hume, with reference to which an 
alleged miraculous fact must be measured.
2. J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II,
Book III, Ch. XXV, p. 167.
3. Ibid, p. 167.
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not in the absence but in consequence of a counteracting 
cause, the will of God© A miracle is no contradiction to 
the causal law; it is a new effect said to be produced by 
the interposition of a new cause. So Mill says that the 
only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to 
the miracle is the improbability that any such cause 
existed.^
Mill thus thinks that Hume has clearly made out
simply this: that in the imperfect state of our knowledge
of natural agencies, no evidence can prove a miracle to
2
one who did not previously believe in God* If we do not 
already believe in supernatural agencies, no miracle can 
prove to us their existence, and an alleged miracle is, 
then, a case for complete disbelief* Mill thinks that the 
miracle, considered merely as an extraordinary fact, may 
be satisfactorily certified by our senses or by testimony, 
but nothing can ever prove that it is a miracle* There is 
still another hypothesis, that of its being the result of 
some unknown natural cause. Even for those who already be­
lieve in God there are two possibilities, namely, a supernatural 
and an unknown natural agency; and with the knowledge 
which we now possess of the general uniformity of the course
1* J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II, 
Book III, Ch. XXV, pp. 167-8*
2* Ibid, p* 1680
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of nature, there is a general presumption against any
supposition of divine agency not operating through general
laws, or in other words, even given independent belief in
God, there is an antecedent improbability in every miracle*^
It is this antecedent improbability of miracles
that Mill emphasizes in part IV of his "Three Essays on
Religion"* Here he undertakes to support Hume's argument
against miracles by making an attempt to show that the
negative presumption against a miracle is very much stronger
than that against a merely new and surprising fact*
Mill begins with a short summary of Hume's argument and
mentions that there are two apparently weak points in it*
One is that the evidence of experience to which Hume appeals
is only negative evidence which is not so conclusive as
positive; since facts of which there had been no previous
experience are often discovered and proved by positive
2
experience to be true* The other apparent weakness is 
that the argument has the appearance of assuming that the 
testimony of experience against miracles is undeviating 
and indubitable, as it would be if the whole question was 
about the probability of future miracles, none having taken
1* J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II, 
Book III, Ch* XXV, pp* 168-9*
2* J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition,
pp* 220-1*
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place in the past; whereas the assertion on the other side 
is that there have been miracles, and the testimony of 
experience is not wholly on the negative side. All the 
evidence alleged in favour of any miracle ought to be 
reckoned as counter evidence in refutation of the ground 
of disbelief in miracles* The question can thus only 
be stated fairly as depending on a balance of positive 
evidence for miracles and a negative presumption from 
the general course of human experience against thernV^
Mill proceeds to support Hume's argument under 
this double correction by emphasising the negative pre­
sumption against miracles. He argues that a new physical 
discovery, even if it consists in defeating a well- 
established law of nature, is only the discovery of another 
law previously unknown. The new phenomenon is found
still to depend on law. "But a miracle, in the very fact
of being a miracle, declares itself to be a supersession 
not of one natural law by another, but of the law which 
includes all others, which experience shows to be universal
2
for all phenomena, viz., that they depend on some law . . . "  
When we say that an ordinary physical fact takes place 
according to some invariable law, we mean that it is con­
nected by uniform sequence or co-existence with some definite
1. J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, p. 221.
2. Ibid, p. 222.
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set of physical antecedents, and that whenever it takes 
place it would always be found that its special set of ante­
cedents has pre-existedo "An event which takes place in 
this manner, is not a miracle* To constitute a miracle 
a phenomenon must take place without having been preceded 
by any antecedent phenomenal conditions sufficient again to 
reproduce it * , * . The test of a miracle is: Were there
present in the case such external conditions, such second 
causes we may call them, that whenever these conditions 
or causes reappear the event will be reproduced? If there 
were, it is not a miracle; if there were not, it is a miracle, 
but it is not according to law: it is an event produced,
without, or in spite of law«"^
The argument against miracles. Mill points out, 
had very little to rest upon until a comparatively modern 
stage in the process of science, that is, until the estab­
lishment of the universal dependence of phenomena on invar­
iable laws* It should be noted that in his 'System of 
Logic* Mill has applied himself to the establishment of 
the universality of laws of nature, or in other words, of 
the principle of the uniformity of nature* He thinks that 
this principle has been indisputably established on empirical 
grounds and offers the strongest ground for disbelief in miracles.
1. J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, 
pp a 224-5*
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To those defenders of miracles who have adapted 
their argument to the universality of laws of nature and 
maintain that a miracle need not necessarily be a violation 
of law and does not necessarily exclude the intervention of 
second causes, Mill has his own reply. If God is said to 
produce miracles by means of second causes, that is, by 
means of antecedent conditions, these antecedent conditions, 
Mill points out, are either sufficient to produce the 
event or they are not. If they are not, the event, i.e. 
the miracle, is not the fulfilment of law but a violation 
of it® If they are, there is a miracle but it is not this 
event but the production of the antecedent conditions in the 
chain of causation in dispensation with the influence of 
physical antecedents. If that influence is never dis­
pensed with but the event called miraculous is produced 
by natural means and those again by others and so on from 
the beginning of things, if the event is in no other way 
a divine act than in having been foreseen and ordained by 
God as the consequence of the forces put in action at the 
creation, then there is no miracle at all, for it is not 
then in any way different from the ordinary events which 
are also products of the ordinary workings of God's prov­
idence*^ Mill thus sticks to the view that a miracle
1* J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, 
pp. 224—6*
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cannot but be a violation of law.
As regards the nature of volition, Mill maintains 
that the power of will is not an originating force as 
something separate from the acts we exert; will does 
not originate force but only directs it.^ Now on the 
argument that just as human volition is constantly modifying 
natural phenomena not by violating their laws, so also 
does the divine volition produce, prevent or modify events 
without violation of law, Mill argues that though the 
analogy might hold good, we do not have any proof of divine 
interference with nature as we have for human interfer- 
enceso "The question of antecedent improbability only 
arises because divine interposition is not certified by 
the direct evidence of perception, but is always a matter 
of inference and more or less of speculative inference."^
The ground on which an event is ascribed to divine volition 
is only negative because there is no other apparent way 
of accounting for its existence. Mill thinks that the 
antecedent presumption against this merely speculative 
inference is extremely strong.
As against such speculative explanation there 
is. Mill points out, always another more probable hypothesis,
1. JoS. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, p. 14?.
2. Ibid, pp# 226-8,
3# Ibid, p. 228,
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namely, that the event may have been produced by physical
causes, in a manner not apparent# "It may either be due
to a law of physical nature not yet known, or to the unknown
presence of the conditions necessary for producing it
according to some known law*"^ Even in the case of an event,
alleged to be miraculous, where we obtain the evidence
from our own senses, the hypothesis of its natural origin
is entitled to preference over that of supernatural one;
for there is no direct evidence of its divine origin*
"The commonest principles of sound judgment forbid us to
suppose for any effect a cause of which we have absolutely
2
no experience ........." We should therefore always
believe, in cases of alleged prodigies, that they were due 
to some unknown natural causes#
Even in the case of those miracles which are said 
to have been dependent upon the will of human beings 
(sometimes professing to be divinely commissioned) it is 
always possible that there may have been at work some 
undetected law of nature which the wonder-worker may have 
acquired the power of calling into action, or that the 
wonder may have been produced by the employment, unperceived 
by us, of ordinary laws, or that the event may have had
lo J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, p# 229
2o Ibid, pp. 229-30*
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no connection with the volition at all, but the supposed 
connection may have been only a matter of coincidence*
Mill thinks that in the case of the last description 
the miracle might be tested by a challenge to repeat it*
He remarks that recorded miracles were seldom or never put 
to this test* There is, therefore, nothing to exclude the 
supposition that every alleged miracle was due to natural 
causes*^
On the basis of the above arguments Mill thinks 
that the case against miracles is complete on the sceptical 
side* He comes to the conclusion which he had previously
ascribed to Hume: that no evidence can prove a miracle
to anyone who did not previously believe in a supernatural 
being. So he says that "no extra-ordinary powers which 
have ever been alleged to be exercised by any human being 
over nature, can be evidence of miraculous gifts to anyone 
to whom the existence of a supernatural Being, and his 
interference in human affairs is not already a vera causa." 
The existence of God cannot be proved by miracles, for if 
a God is not already recognised, the alleged miracle can 
always be accounted for on a better hypothesis than that
lo J.S* Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, 
pp. 230-1.
2. Ibid, pp. 231-2.
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of the interference of a being of whose very existence
it is supposed to be the sole evidence. Thus far, according
to Mill, Hume's argument is conclusive#^
The matter is, however, different if the existence 
of a being who created the world and may well have the power 
to modify it is accepted on independent evidence# So Mill 
says, "Once admit a God, and the production by his direct 
volition of an effect which in any case owed its origin
to his creative will, is no longer a purely arbitrary hypo­
thesis to account for the fact, but must be reckoned with
2
as a serious possibility#" In this case the question 
changes its character, and the decision must depend on what
is known or reasonably supposed as to the manner of God's 
government of the universe. Here again we have two hypo­
theses, namely, (a) that the event supposed to be miraculous 
was brought about by the agencies by which God's government 
is ordinarily carried on, and (b) that it is the result of 
a special and extra-ordinary interposition of his will in 
supersession of those ordinary agencies# We have to decide 
which is the more probable hypothesis.^
lo J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, p. 232#
2# Ibid, p. 232#
3# Ibid, pp. 232-3o
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Mill now argues that assuming as a fact the 
existence and providence of God, the whole of our observation 
of nature proves to us by incontrovertible evidence that the 
rule of his government is by means of second causes, that 
all facts follow uniformly upon given physical conditions, 
and never occur without the appropriate physical conditions 
being realised. Mill once again speaks of the principle 
of the uniformity of nature and remarks that the evidence 
that God's government by second causes or by means of laws 
of nature is universal, is admitted for all except directly 
religious purposes to be conclusive. There is thus a 
very strong negative evidence against a miracle*^
As against this weight of negative evidence there 
is such positive evidence as is produced in attestation 
of exceptions, the positive evidence of miracles. Mill 
thinks that it is possible to have from our own senses 
authentic evidence for an exception to a rule, but we 
never have such evidence for a supernatural fact, which is 
always a matter of speculation. All that we know from 
the evidence of nature concerning the ways of the supernatural 
agent, i.e. God, is in harmony with the theory of natural 
causation and is repugnant to that of sudden supersession 
of natural causation. There is, therefore, a vast pre-
lo J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, 
pp, 233-4,
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ponderance of probability against a miracle,^
Coming to the question of the testimony which 
we possess for the miracles of revealed religions, Mill 
declares it to be extremely imperfect# He, in effect, 
reproduces Hume's arguments that such testimony comes from 
ignorant and credulous people and so on, and concludes that 
they are not worth believing# Thus according to Mill 
the balance of evidence in respect of the reality of miracles, 
even on the assumption of the existence and government of 
God, stands as this, "On the one side, the great negative 
presumption arising from the whole of what the course of 
nature discloses to us of the divine government, as carried 
on through second causes and by invariable sequences of 
physical effects upon constant antecedents# On the other 
side, a few exceptional instances, attested by evidence not 
of a character to warrant belief in any facts in the smallest 
degree unusual or improbable • # , # • "  Mill therefore 
draws his final conclusion that "miracles have no claim what­
ever to the character of historical facts and are wholly 
invalid as evidences of any revelation*"^
1. J.S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Second edition, 
pp, 234-5*
2, Ibid, p, 239*
3* Ibid, p, 239*
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Now, it may be noted that Mill's treatment of the 
subject of miracles as outlined above falls into two parts#
The first part may be said to consist of supporting what 
he takes to be Hume's conclusion, namely, that for a sceptic 
who does not already believe in God a miracle is a case of 
complete disbelief. The second part consists of arguing 
that even on the assumption of the existence of God and his 
government of nature there is a very strong presumption 
against miracles such that we cannot accept them as historical 
facts.
In the first part of his argument Mill takes up 
Hume's position, corrects it and reaffirms it on grounds 
that he considers to be much stronger than those of Hume's,
He develops this part of the argument, we may say, in two 
phases: one is to be found in his "System of Logic" where
he considers miracles in the light of his principle of 
disbelief formulated on the basis of his conception of 
'complete induction'; a miracle is here considered as 
opposed to a complete induction© The other phase is 
developed in "Three Essays on Religion" where, as we have 
Been, he takes a miracle to be opposed not to one law but 
to the whole of natural laws. These two phases, however, 
should not be too sharply distinguished; for both, in 
effect, contain the same views, and in both the ultimate
appeal is to one basic principle, viz©, the universality of
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the principle of the uniformity of nature.
The second part of the argument, although hinted 
to by Mill in "System of Logic", is mere fully developed in 
"Three Essays on Religion". And this is the part in which 
he goes beyond Hume's position# Here again the fundamental 
ground on which the argument stands is the principle of 
the uniformity of nature. It is thus obvious that this particular 
argument against miracles must stand or fall according as 
Mill's formulation of this basic principle is justified or not#
It will, therefore, be enough to concern ourselves here with 
the question whether Mill was successful, as he thinks he was, 
in establishing this principle on empirical grounds# But 
before we come to it directly, we should say a few words about 
the so-called case of total disbelief as formulated by him, 
in which again the ultimate appeal is to the principle of the 
uniformity of nature#
Mill's principle of disbelief, as we have seen, 
is based on his conception of complete or rather completed 
induction# We should note that Hume did not formulate 
complete induction, though he is supposed to have made use 
of it# Mill, of course, singularly applied himself to 
the task of defining induction and of enunciating and ex­
plaining the methods of establishing it# But it is difficult 
to see when, and if at all, the process of induction is 
so complete as to become the ground for absolute disbelief
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in any alleged contradicting e v e n t I n  actual practice, 
our inductions can never go beyond the empirical laws; 
and the empirical laws, we have already pointed out, 
are only contingent and not necessary truth# Mill seems 
to recognise this as when he speaks of the discovery of 
surprising facts necessitating the rejection of a well- 
established law in favour of a better one# In view of 
this, his conception of complete induction may be inter­
preted as that of an ideal case possible in theory only# 
Accordingly his principle of disbelief would stand as 
this: If there is a complete induction, then any fact
alleged to be contradictory to it is 'impossible and is 
to be disbelieved totally#' It is evident that the case 
of disbelief thus formulated is simply a 'theoretical',^ or
rather hypothetical one; and as such it cannot have any 
real application until the hypothetical part of it is
rendered real# Mill's difficulty lies in the very fact
that he applies this hypothetical principle to miracles
without in fact having a real complete induction#
But is there in Mill even an ideal or theoretical
case of complete induction, that is, an induction certain
and necessary in theory at least? The answer must be
1# F#R. Tennant, op# cit#, p# 84#
2# See above, pp# 37> 43-4#
3# J.S. Lawton, Miracles and Revelation, p# %  #
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in the negative. Induction, being based, as it is, on 
experience, cannot even theoretically have the status of 
necessary and certain truth. A little inspection of 
Mill's theory of induction will show that he has in fact 
no right to claim certainty for his induction, however 
rigorously its canons might be employed in any particular 
case; for the very principle upon which induction is based, 
viz., the principle of the uniformity of nature, is so 
argued for by him that it cannot form a solid ground for 
establishing certainty.
The principle of the uniformity of nature is 
fundamental to Mill's philosophy. Induction is based 
on it, and the whole of his argument against miracles, we 
have been, rests upon it. This all-important principle. 
Mill is anxious to point out, is not obtained from an 
instinct^ or from any a priori grounds; in fact, he brings 
all a priori laws down to the level of the a posteriori,
2
or rather denies that there are any a priori laws at all.
He takes this principle as the ground or 'the ultimate major 
premise' of all inductions; and yet he says that it is 
derived as an instance of induction. He thinks that this
1. J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition, Vol. II,
Book III, Ch. XXI, pp. 95 ffo
2. H.S. Box, Miracles and Critics, p. 59*
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universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from 
experience, from the known to the unknown, from facts 
observed to facts unobserved, has been described in different 
forms of language. But "whatever be the most proper mode 
of expressing it, the proposition that the course of nature 
is uniform, is the fundamental principle, or general axiom 
of induction*"^ He then says that this principle is 
"itself an instance of induction, and induction by no means 
of the most obvious kind* Far from being the first induction 
we make, it is one of the last, or at all events, one of 
those which are latest in attaining strict philosophic 
accuracy # . * . This great generalisation is itself founded 
on prior generalisations."
As to the way in which this great generalisation
is established Mill's view is this* We begin by observing
regularities within limited fields of our experience* We
observe that a certain antecedent always precedes a certain
consequent* By a series of processes known as methods
of induction we can distinguish the real cases of such
sequence from the apparent cases. We are thus able to
establish that there is an invariable dependence of one 
consequent upon its antecedent; and by extending the field
lo J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition, Vol. I, 
Book III, Ch. Ill, p. 555.
2* Ibid, p. 555.
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within which the sequence obtains, we are able to assert 
that not only under the observed circumstances, but under 
all circumstances the consequent will follow the antecedent© 
Thus we establish a law of nature, which declares that the 
dependence of the consequent upon the antecedent is in­
variable and unconditional. From such separate laws or 
uniformities we then proceed to the one all-embracing law 
of the uniformity of nature, "The general regularity 
results from the co-existence of partial regularities.
The course of nature in general is constant, because the 
course of each of the various phenomena that compose it 
is so • • • . . From these separate threads of connection 
between parts of the great whole which we term nature, a 
general tissue of connection unavoidably weaves itself, by 
which the whole is held together."^
Now, the above account of the way in which the 
principle of the uniformity of nature is arrived at involves 
serious difficulties. The principle is the last or one 
of the latest generalisations. And yet according to Mill 
it is the basis or the ultimate major premise of all 
inductions including the very first generalisation we make. 
It is thus evident that before we are able to make any 
generalisation or induction at all, we must already have
1. J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. I, 
Book III, Ch. IV, p. 364.
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the principle to make the induction possible; and yet it is
the last generalisation we make* Here we have one of the most
glaring cases of petitio principii or begging the question.
Mill's contention that the principle is both the ground and
the conclusion of induction has become known as the notorious
paradox of induction.
Furthermore, this principle, according to Mill,
is the result of an induction by simple enumeration,^
But induction by simple enumeration can give us only proba-
2
bility and not certainty. Accordingly, the principle of 
the uniformity of nature as an induction is only probable. 
'Complete induction', also called scientific induction, is, 
however, regarded by Mill as certain and it is this complete 
induction which gives us the laws of nature. But complete 
or scientific induction is based on the principle of 
uniformity which is in itself uncertain. It is difficult 
to see how a certain conclusion can be obtained from a 
ground or premise which is uncertain. This is the reason 
why we have said earlier that Mill has no right to claim
3
certainty for his complete induction even in theory, and
J.S. Mill, System of Logic, eighth edition. Vol. II, Book III, 
Ch, XXI, pp. 100-101.
2. Ibid, pp. 100-101.
3. That Mill fails to solve the problem of induction is not
enough to show that the belief in matters of fact cannot be
rationally justified. The rational basis of the belief in
matters of fact may be flexible enough to allow for the 
occurrence of miracles.
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accordingly his principle of disbelief which rests upon 
complete induction falls to the ground.
From the above it should now be clear that Mill's 
conception of the principle of the uniformity of nature, 
is unacceptable and accordingly his argument against 
miracles loses its grounds and must therefore be rejected 
as untenable.
The above is of course the fundamental objection 
to Mill's position in respect of the subject of miracles.
We may, however, add here a few words more about his argument 
against miracles. His consideration of the subject is 
based on the notion that a miracle is a unique phenomenon 
opposed to the whole of laws of nature. And he thinks 
that miracles were seldom or never put to test by the challenge 
of repeating them. We have noted before that some miracles 
are reported to have occurred repeatedly and that this fact 
of repetition of miracles needs some consideration which is 
however absent in both Hume and Mill.
It is very difficult to conjecture how Mill would have 
treated such well-attested cases of repeated miracles as are 
reported from Lourdes in France. He would perhaps say that 
these cases could be considered separately, such that a 
separate natural explanation could be given to each individual 
case. But this would not explain the fact of repetition.
1. See above, pp. 49-50.
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and the separate explanations would fail to explain the common 
characteristics of these cases. A wide variety of diseases 
are, of course, reported to have so far been cured at Lourdes 
since I858, but the process of healing in all these cases is 
the same and all of them are invariably connected with prayer 
and similar other religious facts. The separate explanations 
of these cases, as might be suggested by Mill, would not be 
adequate for explaining the common features of these cases.
For the latter purpose there would have to be some common 
explanation, and in the absence of any indication from Mill,
I should not venture to suggest what he would have taken this 
explanation to be. I believe that no scientific explanation 
in terms of natural causes would be able to account for the 
special characteristics of miracles. We shall return to this 
point in the next chapter.
Mill mentions the test of repetition of miracles 
in connection with his contention that a miracle can always 
be explained as occurring according to natural laws and 
that it is always possible to suppose that the miracle-worker 
possessed the knowledge of, and the power of calling into 
action, some laws of nature unknown to others, or that it was 
a ‘cunningly selected* case of coincidence of command and 
occurrence, that is, a case of commanding an event just about 
to happen. Now, a miracle is not just an ordinary event,
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and if at all it has a natural cause, as Mill thinks it has, 
the cause is unknown. It seems surprising and rather para­
doxical that Mill should suppose that thousands of years ago 
one or some members of a barbarous and ignorant people unworthy 
of trust as witnesses, should have either possessed such 
knowledge and power which we with all our learning and scientific 
knowledge do not possess, or had such cunning foresight which 
we do not have*, For, the characteristics of being barbarous,
ignorant and unworthy of trust, on the one hand, and those of 
possessing such extraordinary knowledge, power and foresight, 
on the other, do not seem to go very well together.
Coming to the question of positive evidences in 
favour of miracles Mill is apparently trying to make an 
improvement upon Hume*s position. He thinks that Hume 
did not consider the evidence of experience alleged in 
favour of miracles as counter evidence in refutation of the 
ground of disbelief in miracles. This, we have seen, 
is one point of Mill's correction of Hume's theory. It is 
not, however, true that Hume altogether left out of consid­
eration the fact of alleged evidences for miracles. The 
main point of difference between the master and the disciple 
in this connection seems to be this: Whereas Hume thought
that even if testimony for miracles amounted to a full proof 
it was counteracted and completely annihilated by uniform
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experience and therefore was to be rejected; Mill thinks 
that if the evidence in favour of an alleged miraculous 
event is authentic, as when obtained directly from our 
senses, we are to accept the evidence, but in that case 
the event is to be taken not as a miracle but as due to 
some natural cause. But when Mill comes to the actual 
consideration of evidences in favour of reported miracles, 
he, in effect, reproduces his master's arguments against 
the trustworthiness of witnesses and so on* He draws the 
very Humean conclusion that we cannot accept such evidence 
or testimony and that therefore the alleged miraculous 
events cannot be regarded as historical facts.
We have already seen that Hume was mistaken in 
rejecting alleged miraculous events as absurd, because 
many of those events were later on rescued as historical 
factso^ Mill, by denying the status of historical facts 
to the alleged miraculous events, commits the same mistake* 
He would, of course, say that such historically accepted 
events were not miracles and had natural causes* As 
against this we may mention two things. Firstly, this 
would not exonerate him from the mistake committed in the 
very act of rejecting such events as impossible; and we
1. See above, s>* 48-9»
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have already pointed out^ that this mistake must be due 
to some confusion in the conception of a miracle as a 
violation of laws of nature. Secondly, even assuming that 
an alleged miraculous event may be shown to have a natural 
cause or a natural explanation, it may yet be possible to 
say that there is still something very special about a 
reported miracle which does not fall within the scope of 
that explanation; and this special feature may yet enable 
us to treat the event as miraculous* We shall come to 
this point later on* Before we do that we would like to 
consider the views of some contemporary thinkers who also 
argue that if any events, alleged as miraculous, really 
happened, they must have some natural explanation and 
therefore are not miracles*
See above, p*49.
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CHAPTER IV
MIRACLES AND SOME CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICISTS
The empiricist tradition on the subject of miracles 
as founded by Hume in the eighteenth century and carried 
on by Mill in the nineteenth century has continued in the 
present time. We propose here to discuss generally some 
contemporary opinions that seem to follow this traditional 
line of thought.
Patrick Nowell-Smith is one of the contemporary 
writers on the subject who have developed their views in 
the Vein of the empiricist tradition. He has developed 
his views in an article originally published in the 
Hibbert Journal in 1950 and later incorporated in "New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology" edited by A. Flew and A. 
MacIntyre. This article has been written in refutation 
of Arnold Lunn's article, "Miracles - The Scientific 
Approach", The Hibbert Journal, April, 1950, - which itself 
is a reply to H.E. Dubs* article, "Mir&oles - A Contemporary 
Attitude", published in the same journal, January, 1950.
Dubs in his article has argued that the eighteenth 
century definition of miracle as a violation of law of 
nature is no more tenable in these days. Modern science 
has been able to unveil the mystery of many facts which
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once were regarded as unexplainable and miraculous® The 
tremendous progress of science has made us aware of the 
fact that all scientific laws are not known to us and that 
in future we may discover laws which will help us to under­
stand many facts hitherto unexplained® So Dubs declares 
that we can never talk of any alleged fact as a violation of 
laws of nature. He says, "As long as we recognise that 
all scientific laws are not yet known, it remains impossible 
to determine positively when all scientific laws are 
violated."^
Dubs appreciates the attempts of the early 
philosophers, particularly Hume, who, according to him, found 
out the deficiencies in the conception of miracle® He
then points out that modern scientists have gradually shown
that "more and more of the classical miracles were actually 
natural events . . . . . .  So many of these supposedly
impossible events have been shown to be merely unusual 
that the remainder can without difficulty be dismissed as 
due to misunderstanding, myth, or mistake." He thus 
maintains the view ithat there can be no proof that scientific 
law is not operating in any happening, no matter how
strange it may be; all events alleged as miraculous are
1. The Hibbert Journal, 1950, p. l62
2. Ibid, p. l60.
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thus subject to laws of nature®
Now, it may be noticed that in the above view 
Dubs maintains virtually the same position as that of Mill 
in so far as both maintain that an alleged miraculous event, 
if real, is due to operation of laws of nature.
The peculiarity of Dubs* position is that he 
offers a definition of miracles which he thinks to be in 
conformity with modern scientific attitude. A miracle, 
according to him, is any wonderful act of God. All events 
that are truly good are God*s acts. A beautiful sunset, 
a friendly companion, true love etc., are all miracles.
This part of his view which is not perhaps very much in line 
with the empiricist attitude, involves serious difficulties 
as to the question of what is good and what is bad and how 
they are related to God. We need not go into these 
questions, for they are not relevant for our purposes.
What may be noted here is that he does not think that there 
is any distinction between reported miracles and ordinary 
events, - a position which is also maintained by Mill, 
Nowell-Smith, Ayer and Flew#
In reply to Dubs, Lunn in his article has argued 
in favour of the conception of miracle as *’an event above or 
contrary to or exceeding nature which is explicable only as 
a direct act of God*"^ Lunn thinks that miracles certainly
1. The Hibbert Journal, April, 1950, p. 245*
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occur and that reality is not *Co-terraious with the
natural order.* He says that we must answer in the
negative the question "whether all phenomena recorded and
witnessed by man are due to purely natural causes*"^ He
maintains that it is on the authority of the scientists
themselves that we declare that a particular phenomenon is
inexplicable as the effect of natural agents and must
2
therefore be ascribed to supernatural agents.
Nowell-Smith*6 article on the subject of miracles 
consists.of arguing against Lunn*s position. His own 
position, therefore; is mainly negative and also very much 
non-committal. It is accordingly difficult, though not 
impossible, to see what his views are.
Nowell-Smith begins his argument against miracles 
by raising an objection which he borrows from Hume; and he 
does so without mentioning the latter, though of course he 
says that it is a familiar objection’. In his version the 
argument stands somewhat as this: Every religion has its
Own stock-of miracles, many of which are well-attested as 
the-Christian miracles. Now if the followers of Christianity 
deny the reality of the miracles of other religions they must 
do 60 from some arbitrary standpoint, such as they themselves 
would condemn. And if they accept them, there must be some
1. The Hibbert Journal, April, 1950, P* 242
2. Ibid, p. 242.
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flaw in the argument by which the devotees of other 
religions prove the existence of their 'Gods* from such 
evidence; and this flaw might well be there in the 
Christian case also*^
As to this argument, as originally put forward 
by Hume, we have said that it is based on the ignorance
of the mutual claims of different revealed religions as
2
to their miracles. It is a statement of fact that 
Christianity acknowledges the miracles connected with the 
earlier prophets mentioned in the Bible, and that Islam 
accepts the miracles connected with the lives of Jesus,
Moses and all other prophets mentioned in the Quran*
Nowell-Smith's main position consists in arguing 
against the concept of miracle as having a supernatural 
explanation, because natural explanation cannot be given 
to them. He says that this conception is based on an 
unstated and unexamined assumption as to the nature of 
natural science and therefore of natural explanation, namely, 
that science is committed to certain definite theories and 
to the use of certain definite concepts. He points out that 
this is a wrong assumption. "Scientific theories are 
continually being overthrown; and the scientific vocabulary 
is continually being revised and enriched . . . .  science
1. Flew and MacIntyre, ed.. New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology, p. 245*
2. See above, p. 49#
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is committed, not to definite theories or concepts, but to
a certain method of explanation*"^ It may be that no
scientist can at present explain certain phenomena* But
it does not follow, Nowell-Smith points out, that the
phenomena are inexplicable by scientific methods, still less
2
that they must be attributed to supernatural agents*
There is still the possibility that "science may be able,
in the future, to offer an explanation which, though couched
in quite new terms, remains strictly scientific,"^ He
proposes to show that this is the only possible alternative
to saying that no explanation is possible*
Lunn thinks that the breakdown of all explanations
in terms of present-day science forces us outside the realm
of the natural and to seek supernatural explanation of
miracles* Nowell-Smith is of the opinion that such a
view makes the mistake of equating science with a certain
set of theories. "An explanation would still be 'natural*
if it made use of quite different terms, provided that its
L
method was scientific*" If this is granted, the problem, 
he thinks, is not whether science can explain everything in
1* Flew & MacIntyre ed*, New Essays in Philosophical Theo-
logy, p. 247.
2. Ibid, p. 247.
3. Ibid, p. 248.
4. Ibid, p. 248,
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current terms, but whether the explanation of miracles 
requires a method quite different from that of science*^
Nowell-Smith then proceeds to explain the nature 
of explanation. He thinks that the introduction of the 
supernatural is due to a failure to investigate what is 
involved in the notion of an explanation. A scientific 
explanation, according to him, is an hypothesis from which
predictions can be made, which can be afterwards verified;
2
and a law is only a well-confirmed hypothesis. Now, 
miracles are either lawful or not. If they are lawful, 
the law of the miracle must "(a) be based on evidence;
(b) be of a general type 'Under such and such conditions, 
so and so will happen*; (c) be capable of testing in 
experience".^ If it conforms to this specification, it 
does not differ from a natural law and therefore the law 
of the miracle cannot be said to be supernatural. "The 
supernatural seems to dissolve, on the one hand into the 
natural and on the other into the inexplicable."
Nowell-Smith thus opposes the conception of 
supernatural explanation. In this connection he says that
1. flew & MacIntyre ed.. New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology, p. 248.
2. Ibid, p. 249.
3. Ibid, p. 249.
4. Ibid, p. 249.
86
his argument is not intended to show that the hypothesis
of supernatural explanation is false; it is intended to
show that it is not an hypothesis at all, because it is
incapable of being used for prediction and is therefore
unverifiable• The conception of supernatural explanation
involves saying that known laws and factors will not
explain this phenomenon; that there must be something
outside but v/e cannot tell what this is and how it
operates. An explanation, he points out, must explain how
an event comes about; otherwise it is simply a learned
or a tendentious name for the phenomenon to be explained.^
Supernatural explanation, for Nowell-Smith, is simply
2
"unscientific and also non-explanatory"»
Nowell-Smith is prepared to admit that the present
hypothesis of science can perhaps never be expanded to
cover miraculous phenomena and that we may require new
concepts and new laws. But he rejects the theory "which
makes it possible to claim that any phenomenon is essentially
inexplicable, the leap to 'supernatural agencies', and the
%
view that such agencies in fact explain the phenomena".
1. Flew & MacIntyre ed., New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology, p. 251,
2. Ibid, p. 252.
3o Ibid, p. 251.
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We thus find that Nowell-Smith is of opinion that if any 
explanation of miracle is expected to be found, it cannot 
be outside the realm of scientific explanation# There might 
conceivably be a form of scientific explanation of miracles 
distinct from other sciences; it might be a distinct field 
of scientific investigation in the way that Physics is 
distinct from Psychology, but it would not, in principle, 
involve any method of investigation other than the scientific*^
Nowell-Smith does not, however, intend to take 
the extreme view that supernatural explanation is a 
contradiction in terras and that all explanation must be 
scientific; for he realises the difficulty of establishing 
such extreme views.
Now, what in the above view of Nowell-Smith calls 
for an immediate observation is his last remark that he 
does not intend to maintain that all explanations are 
scientific* For, he has originally proposed to show that 
scientific explanation is the only possible alternative to 
its being the case that *no explanation is possible*.
In fact, throughout his argument he has tried to maintain 
that natural or scientific explanation is the only 
alternative to inexplicability* In view of this, the
1. Flew & MacIntyre ed*. New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, p. 253*
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last minute realisation of the difficulty of establishing 
this dogma may be said to frustrate his whole position.
It is certainly confusing and leaves his position very 
much unclear.
The same or similar difficulty is involved in 
his conception of the method of explanation. On the 
one hand, he says that an explanation which does not conform 
to his specification is not explanatory, that anything 
not conforming to this specific explanation is inexplic­
able. On the other hand, he says, "I do not say that 
this must be the only method; but I do not see what other 
there can b e " T h i s  sort of contradictory statements 
make his position so very vague that it becomes difficult 
to understand him.
If we however ignore these difficulties, his 
position may be summarised as follows. Miracles cannot 
be said to have supernatural explanation; they are either 
natural or inexplicable. But he rejects the theory 
that any phenomenon is essentially inexplicable. It 
follows, therefore, that miracles have natural or 
scientific explanation - an explanation, we may say, in 
terms of natural causation. In this, his position is the 
same as that of Mill; and what we have said about Mill
1. Flew & MacIntyre ed., New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, p. 24?•
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in this respect may also apply to Nowell-Smith,
Nowell-Smith concedes that miracles may form a 
distinct field of scientific explanation, in the sense in 
which Physics and Psychology are distinct fields of enquiry* 
But he does not define this special field of scientific 
investigation, nor does he indicate what would be the 
nature of the hypothesis required for this special explan­
ation* He thus leaves this part of his argument vague 
and ambiguous# He says in one place that we may accept 
miracles only as extra-ordinary phenomena and that "it is 
only in this sense that the evidence forces us to admit 
that miracles o c c u r " H e  does not here define 'extra­
ordinary phenomena'; and in the absence of this definition 
it seems that he does not make any distinction between the 
reported miracles and such extra-ordinary events as, for 
example, sending rockets to the moon and astronauts orbiting 
round the earth. However that may be, his position here 
differs from that of Hume, as also from that of Mill* Unlike 
Hume and Mill, he does not commit the mistake of rejecting 
reported miracles as historical events on the ground that 
they are impossible* In this, he is one with Dubs and 
A.J. Ayer,
Ayer has not, of course, developed a detailed 
theory on the subject of miracles* He only makes a very
1* Flew & MacIntyre ed*, New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, p* 246*
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brief reference to the subject in a passage in "The Found­
ations of Empirical Knowledge";^ but even then he seems to 
have made his attitude quite clear. He says that there 
is no reason why we should draw any distinction between the 
occurrence of a miracle and that of any other event that 
runs counter to some accepted hypothesis. Accepting that 
the reported miraculous events occurred it cannot be said 
that their occurrence would prove that the operation of 
the relevant laws could be suspended by a higher power.
They only prove "that we were wrong in supposing them to 
be universal laws; and then we should be left with the 
task of trying to find some other laws to put in their 
place," This is again Mill's position, according to 
which, alleged miraculous events must have natural explan­
ation and as such are not miracles.
We thus see that though these contemporary 
empiricists, whose views we have so far considered, do 
not deny the possibility of the rep orted miraculous events 
having occurred, they maintain that these events, if 
real, must have natural explanations. They do not make 
any distinction between the reported miracles and other 
natural events and thus deny their miraculous character.
1, Ayer, A.J., Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p. 208-9#
2. Ibid, p. 208-9.
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We have seen before that this view is supported by Flew 
also#^ But it seems difficult to accept this position.
We have already noticed how the views of these thinkers 
involve various difficulties. We have also seen that 
the claim that every phenomenon must have a natural explan­
ation in terms of natural causes cannot be established on 
empirical grounds. Mill's failure to establish the 
universality of natural causation still hangs on us. It 
certainly goes to the credit of Nowell-Smith that in the 
end he realises, though inconsistently with his original 
proposition, the difficulty of establishing that miracles 
are intrinsically incredible, that supernatural explanation 
is a contradiction in terms, that all explanation is 
scientific,
But even supposing for argument's sake that 
miraculous events may be given natural explanation, is it 
possible to say that such explanation explains these 
events exhaustively, without leaving any remainder that 
might call for a further explanation?
Now, a reported miracle is not an ordinary 
event, nor is it just an event like other extra-ordinary 
events. It is of course extra-ordinary and unusual, but
la See above, ' p, 48
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that is not all about it. It has some very special 
characteristic which is not to be found in a simple extra­
ordinary event. The special characteristic of miracles,
I wish to mention, is that every miracle marks a special 
occasion of need, crisis - physical or moral - or command, 
demand, prayer and the like; that it serves some special 
purpose correlated with religious desires. This is a 
characteristic of miracles which, I think, cannot be explained 
scientifically.
Scientific explanation in terms of natural causes 
consists in showing what natural conditions precede a 
particular event and how they operate; it says, if such 
and such conditions occur, such and such event follows.
Thus, for example, the explanation of an event A would 
consist in pointing out its antecedent conditions, say 
B and C, and their laws. It would say, Â occurs whenever 
B and C appear. But in cases of miracles such explanation 
in terms of antecedent natural conditions cannot fully 
account for the occurrence of the event. An earthquake, 
a cyclone, or any such natural event is explained scient­
ifically by finding out its natural antecedents and their 
laws. Here the occurrence of the event has nothing to 
do with the need, crisis, command or prayer of a person 
or persons or any other agents, A cyclone or an earthquake
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or any other similar natural event is independent of, or 
rather indifferent to, the needs and commands of individuals® 
But if an event which, from the scientific point of view, 
is thus indifferent occurs when someone needs and commands 
it, the situation becomes a very special one in which the 
event serves some definite purpose. The explanation in 
terms of the usual or supposed antecedent natural conditions 
and their laws, in other words the scientific explanation 
of such a special event, cannot fully account for its 
occurrence; for it will not explain why the event should 
happen at the particular place and the particular moment 
of someone's need, command or prayer. The special purpose 
served by such an event calls for explanation which does 
not form part of the scientific explanation in terms of 
natural causes.
It will perhaps be said (and in fact Mill says
so^) that the special need and command need not be part
of the explanation of the event, for the need and the
command may yet be supposed to have no necessary connection
with the occurrence of the event, that the fact of their
accompanying the occurrence may be only a matter of
accidental coincidence. In fact, there are cases of 
extraordinary events where need or purpose and command
See above, pp. 62-3*
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may coincide with the occurrence quite accidentally* Thus, 
for example, a person badly in need of money may win a big 
dividend from a football pool, or may come to inherit quite 
unexpectedly a big property due to the sudden death of a 
distant relation whom he hardly knew but who bequeathed 
his entire estate to him. It will, of course, be a very 
surprising event, but neither he nor anybody else will 
call it a miracle. A miracle has to be distinguished 
from such cases of accidental coincidence.
An accidental coincidence is a case where a 
certain condition is found to be present in the situation, 
which does not always accompany the occurrence of the event; 
we in fact know many cases of the event where it happens 
without the condition in question. Thus in the above 
example the winning of a big dividend from a football 
pool or inheriting an estate is not an uncommon event; 
moreover, the event happens in many cases without the need 
or will of the winner or inheritor. It is therefore a 
case of accidental coincidence of the need of the person 
and the occurrence of the event. But if a condition is 
such that it is present in every case of a certain type 
of occurrence and that none of the cases occurs without 
the condition happening, the condition is not accidental. 
Now, miracles are a type of events in which the need and 
command, the religious purpose, are invariably present.
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No miracle is said to have happened which is not related 
to such need and command, to some special religious 
purpose® Moreover, every miracle is a very highly 
improbable event. This improbability being invariably 
connected with a certain need, command or prayer, with a 
certain religious phenomena, gives miracles a special status 
which thus enables us to distinguish them from cases of 
accidental coincidence. Let us take, for example, the 
partition of the Red Sea. Supposing that this happened, 
we cannot possibly explain it by saying that it was a case of 
accidental coincidence of the need of the Israelites and 
the command of their religious leader on the one hand and 
the occurrence of the event on the other. It is a very 
special event having occurred only at that moment of need 
and command. Scientists today may say that such an 
event is possible when such and such atmospheric conditions 
may prevail. But this will not explain why the event 
should have occurred only at that particular place and 
that particular time of need and command but not at any 
other place and time. It is an event which is thus 
connected with a very special purpose that is correlated 
with religious desires, the explanation of which requires 
something more than the mere supposed scientific explanation 
in terms of natural antecedent conditions.
In virtue of the regularity with which very highly
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improbable events of many different kinds can be claimed to 
occur in situations where divine agency is invoked, one might 
treat such events as falling under 'scientific type* law 
which could be drawn up alongside the more familiar bodies of 
scientific law in the form of a statistical law of relative 
frequency of successful invocations to invocations in general, 
This should, perhaps, satisfy Nowell-Smith*s criterion for 
an explanation of such events. But it would no more be an 
ultimate explanation of the occurrence of miracles in 
individual cases than the relative frequency of aggressive 
temperaments among those who have had a strict nursery regime
provides an ultimate explanation of why the particular 
individuals who do develop aggressive tendencies do so rather 
than those who do not. The model of an ultimate explanation 
by which statistical laws fail to be explanatory is that of 
the explanation a human being can give of his action in a 
certain situation* A man can sometimes make clear to us 
the considerations which weighed with him in his action in 
such a way that we fully understand how he came to act in 
the way he did. This model of explanation of events is 
implied in the concept of miracle, which is thought of, as 
we have seen, as an event due to divine intervention in 
answer to requests, prayers, etc* The sceptic no doubt 
objects to an appeal to this type of explanation in the 
case of an agency which, for him, is 'ex hypothesi' doubtful. 
But his position is as follows. He is confronted with a
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number of highly improbable events of very different kinds, 
all of which can be explained by the one hypothesis of a 
divine intervention in accordance with humanly intelligible 
considerations, occurring in situations recognisably involving 
a concern with religious worship generally and with appeals 
for such intervention* No one alternative hypothesis 
can explain this series of events. Apart from this explan­
ation they must appear as a whole series of events whose 
improbability is at least the product of the improbability 
of each event. The sceptic's reason for opting for the 
latter alternative is simply his conviction that there are 
no divine entities that could so intervene* But this is 
the question at issue here, and to opt for the intrinsically 
totally improbable hypothesis of a series of unrelated 
coincidences is surely a mark of irrationality,
A miracle, we have seen, is not a case of accidental 
coincidence; nor is it a case of what may be called the 
effect of psychological influence* When a person suffering 
from a very difficult disease is cured by mere contact with 
a great religious teacher or by visiting a particular place 
of religious significance, such a cure may be explained 
as being due to the faith or confidence that is produced 
in the mind of the patient by such contact or visit* But 
a miracle should be distinguished from such cases of 
psychological effects. Thus, if and when a man, born blind,
suddenly gains sight by coming in contact with a religious
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teacher, or by the mere will or command of such a teacher 
even when the blind man is not expecting any such change 
to happen, the case is a very special one. Here the 
explanation in terms of psychological influence would not 
simply do. Moreover, in the case of the events of the 
nature of partition of a sea and the like the question of 
psychological influence is simply irrelevant.
As illustration of the above points in the context 
of present day cases we may refer to the reports from Lourdes. 
We have already said that these cases of miraculous cure 
have some common special characteristics. The presence of 
prayer is an invariable and "indispensable"^ condition to the 
occurrence of these phenomena. Accordingly, any explanation 
of these occurrences must take into consideration the 
presence of the religious fact of prayer and therefore 
scientific explanation in terms of natural causes would not, 
from the nature of the case, be a sufficient explanation of 
them® Moreover, these cases include patients of various 
types with various diseases; among them there are infants 
and children even under the age of two* These latter cases 
are sufficient to eliminate the possibility of an explanation 
in terms of psychological influence referred to above.
One interesting feature of the Lourdes cases is that 
they seem to suggest themselves as a sort of reversal of the
1® B.G. Sandhurst, Miracles still happen, p. Il4.
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established canons of scientific explanation. Scientific
explanation in terms of natural causation is based on the
maxim; same cause, same effect. As applied to medical
science this principle means that a particular cure produces-
results that can be taken as the healing of a certain type
of diseases. Thus, for example, A cures X diseases, B cures
Y diseases and so on. But A is not a cure for Y diseases,
nor is B a cure for X diseases. At Lourdes, however, this
principle is entirely inapplicable. Here we have cases of a
very wide variety of diseases, but only one cure; the process
of healing is the same in all the cases.^ It may be noted
that all these cases are investigated and attested by a
reputed body of scientists, including medical doctors,
2
neurologists, psychiatrists and others. Here we have 
a situation in which one cause, namely the one cure, produces 
a variety of effects, namely the healing of various types of 
illness. This appears to be in conflict with the maxim:
Same cause, Same effect. This is perhaps one reason why
1. B.G. Sandhurst, Miracles Still Happen, pp. 113-4.
2. Dr. F. Leurret, President of the Medical Bureau at Lourdes, 
reports that the cases of illness are thoroughly investi­
gated and analysed, and that it is a condition for a
case to be declared miraculous that all the investigators 
must agree and the cure must be instantaneous, total and 
definite and that the members of the Medical Bureau must 
be in agreement in declaring the cure as inexplicable, 
cf. Lourdes, 1953, pp* 91-2.
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scientific explanation on the basis of the maxim is inapplic­
able to these cases of miraculous occurrences.
Thus we may now say that a miracle is a very special 
event. In the first place, it is *’a mighty work or wonder, 
that is, it must appear to be outside ordinary course of nature",^ 
It is highly improbable but not impossible* It should be 
noted that the empiricists who argue that the alleged 
miracles have natural explanation, do so on the assumption 
that they are possible* In the second place, a miracle is 
an occurrence which is connected with a special need and 
command; it is correlated with some definite religious 
desire or purpose* Thirdly, a miracle as an extra-ordinary 
and wonderful event is not a case of accidental coincidence, 
nor does it contain in its explanation the element of 
psychological influence.
Miracles are, therefore, a very specific kind of 
events. Every reported miracle is an event that occurred 
in a situation characterised by some definite need, command 
or prayer* Mill, Nowell-Smith and other empiricist thinkers 
who argue that the reported miracles must have natural 
explanation and therefore are not miraculous, ignore the 
special nature of these events; they ignore or do not
J.M. Cameron, The Month, 1959i P* 292*
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like to recognise that these events serve any special need 
or purpose and are connected with some demand or command 
correlated with religious desires. But if we recognise, as 
we think we must, this special feature of miracles along 
with the failure of scientific explanation to account for it, 
we must then admit that miracles cannot be equated with other 
natural events. It will therefore follow that the empiricist 
claim that the alleged miracles are in fact non-miraculous 
because they can be given natural or scientific explanation, 
is untenable.
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CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters we have given an 
account of a tradition on the subject of miracles which 
is a result of the application of the classical empiricist 
method to the subject* It may be said that the tradition 
has developed in two phases* The first phase consists 
in arguing that a miracle, being a violation of laws of 
nature, is in fact impossible; in rejecting the testimony 
for miracles; and in thus rejecting the reported miracles 
as historical events* The second phase consists in 
maintaining that if any event alleged as miraculous really 
happened it must have a natural explanation in terms of 
natural causes and as such is not miraculous#
Hume's arguments against miracles that marked 
the beginning of this tradition illustrate the first phase 
of its development* The views of the contemporary empiricists 
that we have considered above represent the second phase of 
the tradition* Mill's position may be said to incorporate 
elements of both the phases* On the one hand, he agrees 
with Hume in rejecting testimony for the reported miracles 
and denying them the status of historical events* On the 
other hand, he argues that natural causation is universal 
and that any real event, found to contradict known laws of
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nature or alleged as miraculous, can be given a natural 
explanation in terms of natural causes* Thus the second 
phase of the tradition may be said to have begun with 
Mill; and it is this phase that has been particularly 
emphasized by the present-day followers of classical 
empiricism*
It may be mentioned that the two phases, 
though different in approach and form of argument, have 
one fundamental position common between them* Besides 
both being professedly based on the same method, they 
have the same ultimate aim; each tries to deny in one way 
or another the fact of there being and having been any 
miracles* The first phase opposes the factual or 
physical possibility of miracles;^ and with that goes 
the historicity of the reported miracles* In the second 
phase, though the historicity of the events reported as 
miraculous is not denied, these events are stripped of 
their miraculous nature; thus here again there is nothing 
that is, in fact, a miracle.
Now, the first phase, as developed by Hume and 
supported by Mill, cannot, we have seen, maintain itself 
against criticism. We shall not repeat here all the 
objections we have raised* We may simply mention that 
neither Hume's conception of 'uniform experience', nor
1. See above, pp. 51 ff
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Mill's formulation of the principle of the uniformity of 
nature has been able to offer it a strong ground to 
stand upon* The very fact that at least some of the 
events, discarded by these thinkers because they are 
miraculous, have now been rescued as historical events, 
shows clearly how mistaken their views had been*
The contemporary followers of classical 
empiricism seem to have realised some of the difficulties 
of the first phase of the tradition which has therefore 
lost favour with them* They no more find it possible to 
reject the reported miracles as historical events* Hence 
their emphasis is on the second phase* But we have seen 
that their claim that an alleged miracle, if it really 
happened, must have a natural explanation in terms of 
natural causation and is not therefore miraculous, is not 
justifiable* The first part of the claim rests on the 
assumption that every event must have a natural or 
scientific explanation, - an assumption which cannot be 
established on empirical grounds* As against the second 
part, we have argued in the last chapter that every 
reported miracle has something very special about it which 
the supposed scientific explanation does not and cannot 
explain; that a miracle cannot be equated with other 
natural events#
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It follows, therefore, that the empiricist 
tradition on the subject of miracles, as we have considered, 
has not been able to establish itself in either of its 
phases. In spite of the fact that the founder of the 
tradition has 'flattered* himself that he has produced 
a 'decisive argument* against miracles, we must conclude 
that neither he himself, nor Mill, nor their present-day 
followers have been successful in offering any argument 
against miracles so as to prove them impossible, or 
render them non-miraculous.
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